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Abstract 
 
In this paper we look at tax credit policy as an instrument to foster hiring with open-end 
rather than with fixed-term contracts. In particular, we examine a specific regulation 
adopted in Italy in the year 2000 (Credito d’Imposta). This policy offers a generous and 
automatic tax credit to all firms hiring workers with open-end contracts. The eligibility 
criteria are very mild for both firms and workers. Our results seem to indicate, both 
formally and empirically, that firms used this subsidy to hire under open-end contracts 
primarily those workers who would have been hired under such a contract regardless the 
subsidy, even though after a short transition into temporary employment. Our estimates 
suggest that, compared to 2000, in 2001 the subsidy did not increase the overall 
probability to be hired, but changed the composition of new employees. It increased the 
chances to find an open-end contract but in a rather uneven way across workers. 
Conditional on being hired, the probability rose by about 10 per cent for workers holding 
a college degree, by about 4 per cent for people with a high school diploma, while did not 
change or might have even slightly declined for less educated workers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last few years, fixed-term contracts have gained the center stage in the economic 
debate on labor market reforms in Europe. The debate has mostly focused on two main 
features. The first one deals with the magnitude of the phenomenon: very rapidly, 
temporary jobs have indeed become a major novelty in the European labor markets. 
Table 1 shows that in many OECD countries a sizeable share of employees work under 
fixed-term contracts in year 2000. In some countries (such as Ireland, UK, Luxemburg 
and Hungary) they still represent a small share, but in most cases they appear to account 
for at least 10 per cent of total employees; in few countries these shares are even higher: 
32.1, 20.4, 20.4 per cent in Spain, Portugal and Turkey respectively. Only ten years 
earlier temporary occupation represented a much smaller fraction of employment.  
The second feature originates from the observation that in several countries – such as 
Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany and Italy - a sizeable portion of 
newly created jobs in the 1990s has taken the form of fixed-term contracts (Table 1) 
 
This rapid expansion has fuelled researchers’ effort to understand the effects of fixed-
term contracts on labor market outcomes. At this stage there exists indeed an unsettled 
dispute in the literature concerning their effectiveness. On the one hand it is suggested 
that, by introducing some form of flexibility into an otherwise highly regulated labor 
market, they tend to provide young workers with a stepping-stone towards permanent 
employment (Booth, Francesconi, Frank 2000 for UK; Contini, Pacelli and Villosio 2000 
for UK, Germany and Italy). On the other hand, there is increasing evidence that they 
might represent a “dead-end”, in that they further segment the labor market between 
insiders holding open-end contracts and outsiders who find themselves confined at the 
margins, trapped between repeated spells of unemployment and fixed-term contracts 
(Blanchard and Landier 2001 for France, Güell 2002a and Güell and Petrongolo (2002), 
Amuedo-Dorantes (2000, 2001) for Spain, Istat 2000 for Italy).  
 
In its 2002 Employment Outlook, OECD attempts to strike a fair balance suggesting that 
“Depending on the country considered, between one-third and two-thirds of temporary 
workers [including Temporary Help Agency workers] moves into a permanent job within   3 
a two-year time interval, suggesting some potential for upward mobility. The other side 
of the coin is that one out of five temporary workers drops out of employment in the 
succeeding two years and there is some evidence that employers provide less training to 
temporary than to permanent workers” (OECD 2002).    
 
This kind of concerns led policy makers in the recent years to intervene on fixed-term 
contracts in an attempt to reduce their negative effects, while retaining their positive 
sides. According to OECD (2002), governments have intervened both by setting 
restrictions to the adoption of temporary contracts (and the degree of employment 
protection accorded to “permanent” employees), and by establishing equal-treatment 
standards requiring employers to harmonize pay or fringe benefits between temporary 
and permanent employees, as well as by providing employers with incentives to either 
hire certain disadvantaged job-seekers on temporary jobs or move them into permanent 
positions.  
 
Notwithstanding these legislative activities, best practices are yet to be found and there 
seems to exist a substantial uncertainty about the best way to go, perhaps because of the 
lack of clear-cut evidence from empirical research. 
 
As in others countries, fixed-term contracts have received in Italy a great deal of attention 
from policy makers, business associations as well as unions. In the 1990s, the adoption of 
fixed-term contracts was encouraged by widening their scope and easing their regulatory 
burden; at the same time firms received incentives to transform temporary into permanent 
jobs
1. However, policy design was not always fully consistent and might have induced 
unwanted and non-trivial negative implications.  
 
In this paper we examine the effects of the most important and recent financial incentive 
of this kind, i.e. a generous tax credit granted to firms choosing to hire workers under 
open-end contracts. In particular, two questions have been addressed. On the one hand, 
                                                 
1 In Spain this same strategy has been adopted since the second half of the 1990s with two important laws  
(Royal Decree 8/1997 and Royal Decree 9/1997), which reduced social security contribution and dismissal 
costs for employers who transform temporary into permanent contracts (Amuedo-Dorantes 2000, 2001).     4 
we examined whether this new incentive did actually increase an average worker’s 
probability to be hired with an open-end contract. On the other hand, we investigated 
whether this probability increase has been homogenous across workers, i.e. whether it 
provided everybody with an additional opportunity to enter permanent employment or 
rather favoured only specific workforce groups.  
 
Our results seem to suggest firms used this tax credit provision in order to hire under 
open-end contracts mostly those workers who, on average, turn out to have the highest 
probability to be permanently hired even without the subsidy, perhaps after a short 
transition into temporary employment. Our estimates suggest that, compared to 2000, in 
2001 the subsidy did not increase the overall probability to be hired, but it changed the 
composition of newly hired employees. It in fact increased the chances to find an open-
end contract but in a rather uneven way across workers.  Conditional on being hired, the 
probability rose by about 10 per cent for workers holding a college degree, by about 4 per 
cent for people with a high school diploma, while did not change or might have even 
slightly declined for less educated workers.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the context, by 
highlighting the basic facts about fixed-term contracts in Italy with special regards to 
regulation, figures as well as reasons for concern. Section 3 explains in some detail the 
nature of the tax credit provision put forward in Italy at the end of 2000. We focus the 
attention on the regulatory aspects, the incentive magnitude and its actual usage.  Section 
4 presents a simple conceptual framework that helps to predict what type of workers turns 
out to benefit most from the tax credit provision. Section 5 describes the information we 
use to take these predictions to the data. Evaluation of the prediction is carried out in 
section 6 in a preliminary, descriptive way.  Section 7 extends the analysis of section 6 
through a simple econometric framework to estimate, on the one hand, the effects of the 
new regulation on the probability of being hired with an open-end contract, conditional 
on having been employed in the subsidized period; on the other hand, its impact on the 
overall hiring probability. Section 8 finally concludes.   5 
2. Context.  Basic facts about fixed-term contracts in Italy: regulation, figures, 
concerns.  
 
2.1 Regulation 
As a general rule the Italian law prohibits any time limitation to a labor contract except 
for some specific circumstances clearly stated by the law itself
2. These exceptions are: 1) 
seasonal activities; 2) temporary replacement of an employee on leave; 3) occasional 
activities which are time predetermined and not usually carried out by the firm; 4) special 
contracts requiring different skills that are not usually provided by the firm; 5) special 
skills in the movie and airline industries; 6) technical and administrative top 
management
3.    
 
A fixed-term contract can be renewed only once under special circumstances for at most 
the same original duration and in any case with worker’s agreement. If the contract 
extends beyond the original duration, the corresponding wage rate has to be increased by 
20 per cent for each day following the deadline up to the 10
th day, and by 40 per cent 
thereafter. Moreover, if the contract goes beyond the 30
th day after the deadline it is 
automatically considered an open-end contract. 
 
Alongside with this type, there are special fixed-term contracts that are designed to 
provide young workers with work experience along with formal training (Apprenticeship 
and Work and Training contracts, “Apprendistato e Contratti di Formazione Lavoro”). 
The duration of these contracts stretches from 18 months to 4 years; they can be signed 
by workers aged 16 to 32 (with different duration and regulation depending on age and 
level of education). They are different in nature from the normal fixed-term contracts as 
they are thought of as stepping-stones into permanent employment for younger workers. 
Because of this special status they are rewarded with lower than regular social security 
                                                 
2  This general rule was true until a new law was passed in the summer of 2001. Since then, fixed-term 
contracts are not regarded any longer as an exception to the general rule but are awarded equal dignity to 
permanent contracts as long as there exist valid technical-organizational reasons for their adoption. A 
complete history of the regulation of fixed-term contracts is presented in Appendix 1. 
3 For a full description of the regulation for these and other types of contracts, see Ministero del Lavoro 
2001.   6 
contributions for amounts that differ according to contract type, firm size, economic 
sector and geographical area and range from a minimum of 25 per cent to a virtual 
maximum of 100 per cent.  
 
An important feature of the Italian institutional setting is that a great deal of labor market 
regulation is left to the negotiation between business organizations and unions. The law 
sets indeed the general framework, while the actual details are decided in the national 
sector contracts. Thus, even in the absence of normative intervention there might be 
important changes in the actual regulation of specific issues. A pivotal example of this 
pattern is the fixed-term contract regulation. In the early 1990s, national sector contracts 
set ceilings to fixed-term contract adoption at the firm level at around 5 to 7 per cent of 
employment in the manufacturing sector and 10 per cent in the construction and retail 
industries. However, actual usage was below these ceilings because unions managed to 
narrow the set of specific situations in which fixed-term contracts were allowed. As the 
industrial relation climate became less conflicting in the 1990s, unions agreed to widen 
the scope for temporary jobs and relaxed their maximum usage constraint. For example, 
in 1998 ceilings were substantially increased up to 20 per cent in construction and 25 per 
cent in the chemical sector (Bank of Italy 2000).      
 
2.2 Figures  
Fixed-term contracts have become a relevant feature of the Italian labor market in the 
1990s. From the second half of the 1970s up until the early 1990s, they have represented 
a non-trivial but constant share of total employment, concentrated in the agricultural 
sector. In the second half of the 1980s this share grew because of the introduction of the 
Work and Training contracts in 1984, but the actual take-off occurred between 1993 and 
1999 when they have been growing at a double-digit rate from 6.1 to 9.8 per cent of total 
employees (Fig.1).  In this same period they represented the only expanding type of 
employment and accounted for the virtually whole growth of dependent employment 
(Fig.2).  This increase was encouraged by the easing of the existing constrains established 
by national labor contracts.    7 
In 2000 their expansion was accompanied by a recovery of permanent employment that 
picked up as a consequence of the strong up-turn in labor demand, especially in the 
northern regions of the country
4.   
 
Fixed-term contracts tend to be equally distributed among males and females, mostly 
young (in 2001, 60 per cent of them was less than 35 years old; Table 2), with lower than 
average years of schooling (in 2001, half of them held at most a lower secondary school 
diploma
5), working in the services (63 per cent in 2001) and agriculture (12 per cent). 
The great majority of people (44.4 per cent in 2001) holding a fixed-term contract do so 
because they could not find a job with an open-end contract (heading “No better 
opportunities” in Table 2). About one-third of them is in an Apprenticeship and Work 
and Training type of contracts.      
               
2.3 Concerns  
In many OECD countries fixed-term contracts have been welcomed as a mean to foster 
younger workers’ opportunities to gain access to their first job. However, they are also a  
source of concern since they might lead to an increase in worker’s insecurity and 
precariousness (OECD 2002).  These same reasons for concern seem to hold true in Italy. 
The growth of precarious jobs has been paralleled by an expansion in the share of low-
paid workers
6 among all employees. As illustrated in Figure 3, this share went up from 8 
per cent in 1989 to more than 18 per cent in 1998, reversing the trend of the previous 15 
years (Brandolini et. alt. 2001). 
 
We cannot directly and immediately attribute this reversal to the spread of fixed-term 
contracts, although we do have evidence that people in temporary jobs earn less and work 
fewer hours than people in permanent jobs. In Table 3 we computed  the differential in 
                                                 
4 In 2000, as many as 6.6 per cent of firms in the north-eastern regions and 3.4 in the north-western ones  
claimed they could not find enough workers (Bank of Italy 2001). For a discussion of the mismatch 
measure in Italy, see Brandolini and Cipollone 2001.   
5 The Italian schooling system is organised along eight years of compulsory education (five years of 
primary education and three additional years of lower secondary school leading to a junior high-school 
diploma), which can be followed by 4-5 years of upper secondary education (terminating with a high-
school degree) and by further years of tertiary education leading at least to a college degree (a college 
degree is obtained on average after 4 years of tertiary education).   8 
log hourly wages and worked hours between workers with open-end contracts and 
workers with temporary jobs (distinguishing between fixed-term contracts and workers 
hired by Temporary Help Agencies), using the Bank of Italy Survey on Household 
Income and Wealth for the year 2000. The raw differential suggests that males in fixed-
term jobs (Temporary Help Agency jobs) earn 32 (43) per cent less than those with open-
end contracts. The adjusted differential shrinks considerably but remains sizeable: 12 per 
cent for fixed-term and 21 per cent for Temporary Help Agency workers. About the same 
story holds true for females in temporary jobs; the wage differential for those in fixed-
term occupations is considerably smaller and not significantly different from zero once 
adjusted for observable characteristics.  
 
The wage differential cumulates with the hours of work differences to further widening 
the overall annual earnings gap between workers in permanent and temporary jobs. On 
average, a male worker with a fixed-term contract works 530 hours less than a 
correspondent open-end contract worker. This gap reduces to 390 hours when worker’s 
characteristics are taken into account, but it still remains quite sizeable. About the same 
pattern can be observed for females. 
      
Mobility out of fixed-term employment seems to be rather low. In October 1999 out of 
100 workers whose first job was a temporary job, 38 were still in a temporary position 
after three years (20 in the same initial job and 18 in a different fixed-term job, Table 4), 
38 exited the employment status either into unemployment or out of the labor force, 4 
have changed status into self-employment and 21 gained access to permanent positions.  
Workers whose first job was a permanent position faced much brighter prospects; after 
three years 90 per cent of them were still into permanent employment (81.3 per cent in 
the same job and 8.8 in a different one), 1.3 per cent moved into self-employment, 1.8 
into a temporary occupation and 6.8 per cent exited the employment status. Self-
employed workers faced similar probabilities. 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
6 Low-paid workers are here defined as those earning less than two-thirds of the median income.   9 
After 5 years from the first job the chances for fixed-term workers look slightly better: 36 
per cent of them have gained access to an open-end contract, 27 remained in a temporary 
occupation (10 per cent in the same job and 17.2 in a new fixed-term contract) and 30 per 
cent exited into either unemployment or inactivity. These figures would imply an annual 
transitional probability into permanent occupation of about 11.5 per cent that translates 
into an average waiting time of about 8.7 years. This is a considerably longer period than 
that suggested by OECD, and is similar to that reported by Blanchard and Landier for 
France (8.2 years for young workers in 1996) and that reported by Amuedo-Dorantes for 
Spain (8.3 for all workers in 1996). 
 
Low mobility does not only affect marginal workers, looking instead quite widespread. 
Table 5 reports transitions from fixed-term contracts (towards all status in the labor 
market) by some basic worker characteristics. Compared to females, males show slightly 
better chances to enter open-end jobs but, at the same time, they tend to suffer higher 
risks to exit employment. Holding a college degree, as opposed to a high school diploma, 
does not improve the probability to gain access to permanent employment in the first 
three years after entering the first job. However, more years of schooling seem to reduce 
the risk of exiting employment while workers with shorter education appear doomed at 
the margins of the market, wandering between unemployment and temporary 
occupations. Indeed, even after 5 years from the first job, 40 per cent of them are either 
unemployed or inactive while 25 per cent find themselves into transient jobs. 
 
3. Subsidy to open-end contracts: regulation, magnitude, usage 
 
3.1 Regulation 
Like many other OECD countries, Italy has attempted to reduce the negative effects of 
fixed-term contracts. The strategy adopted aims at increasing the mobility out of fixed-
term contracts by providing fiscal incentives to firms that either transform temporary into 
permanent positions or directly hire workers under open-end contracts. There are several   10 
examples of this strategy
7. However until the year 2000 these incentives have been small, 
often targeted to particular areas, firm types or worker categories.  
 
The Italian fiscal law for the year 2001 (issued at the end of 2000) has instead provided a 
new incentive in the form of a general, automatic and quite generous tax credit to all 
firms hiring workers with open-end contracts. In particular, this provision states that, 
every firm hiring a new worker on a permanent basis is rewarded with a tax credit of 
about 413 € (620 for workers in the South) per month and per worker from the hiring 
moment until the end of December 2003. This new tax credit applies to all new hires 
taking place from October 2000. Thus, for a southern worker hired in October 2000 and 
retained until December 2003 each firm will receive about 24.200 €. The tax credit is 
awarded only if both worker and firm are eligible. A worker is eligible if at least 25 years 
old and not working with an open-end contract in the 24 months preceding her/his hiring. 
A firm is eligible if the newly hired worker increases the overall level of permanent 
employment - at the firm level - over the average recorded in the period ranging from 
October 1999 to September 2000. The tax credit can be claimed against any kind of taxes 
such as income tax, social security contributions, value-added tax. Furthermore, it can be 
passed over to different fiscal years.    
 
3.2 Magnitude 
The contribution provided by this subsidy looks quite generous. Figure 4 shows the 
percentage reduction in the per-capita labor cost due to the tax credit (using data for the 
year 2000) by sector and geographical area. This reduction is variable because the tax 
credit is a fixed amount that only increases for southern workers, while the average labor 
cost differs both across sectors and geographical areas. The evidence shows a labor cost 
reduction, which ranges from 9.2 per cent in the banking sector in the central and 
northern regions to almost 60 per cent in the agricultural sector in the South. On the 
average of the private, no-farm sector the reduction amounts to more than 30 per cent in 
the South and to 16 per cent in the central and northern regions. These estimates 
understate the effect of the tax credit because labor cost data refer to an average worker, 
                                                 
7 For example, the incentives to the transformation of work and training contracts into permanent ones or   11 
while the correct reference should be the labor cost of a new young worker, which is 
usually below the average. It should be mentioned however that national accounts also 
include estimates of the labor cost in the underground economy, which is most likely 
smaller than the legal labor cost for a new entrant; however, this effect only attenuates 
underestimation.    
 
 
3.3 Usage 
The new tax credit seems to have been very successful in 2001.  We have two sources of 
information about the actual usage of this new instrument. The first source is the Labor 
Force Survey, which provides data on the number of newly hired employees 
distinguishing between open-end and fixed-term contracts. Figure 5 extends the numbers 
of Figure 2 to the year 2001. It reports the quarterly absolute growth of total employees 
by type of contract with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year. It 
suggests that in January 2001
8 - i.e. the first survey since the new tax credit was in force - 
fixed-term contracts halted their expansion, which had been the only source of dependent 
employment growth since 1993; in October 2001 the number of fixed-term contracts was 
smaller than one year before. It must be remarked however that a slow-down had already 
occurred in 2000, but most of it was due to a strong labor demand that, especially in the 
northern regions, turned the labor market into a seller market, thereby allowing workers 
to negotiate hires with open-end contracts
9. In 2001, open-end contracts went up and fully 
compensated the slow-down in fixed-term contracts. This represents the strongest 
increase of permanent employment since 1993 and looks quite remarkable given the 
sharp slow-down in the economic activity registered in 2001 (the value-added growth in 
the private sector fell from 4.2 to 2.5 per cent between 2000 and 2001). 
 
The second source of information consists of the figures collected by the Ministry of 
Finance (and reported by the Ministry of Labor 2001), keeping track of the foregone 
                                                                                                                                                   
the tax credit provision for small firms hiring permanent workers in economically depressed areas.  
8 Italian Labor Force Surveys are conducted in the first week of, respectively, January, April, July, and 
October.    
9 Maya Guell (2002b) explains this effect in an efficiency-wage context in which the type of contract each 
worker is offered represents a discipline device.   12 
revenues due to the tax credit. Figure 6 shows these foregone revenues as a share of total 
social security contributions in 2001 and the correspondent number of involved workers. 
Between January and December 2001, the monthly flow of foregone revenues increased 
from 0 to more than 0.7 per cent of the monthly flow of social contributions. This implied 
188.000 involved workers in November 2001, that is about 1.2 per cent of total 
employees. These figures suggest the tax credit has been a large success, much beyond 
the 83.000 workers initially foreseen for the entire subsidized period, i.e. October 2000-
December 2003 (Bank of Italy 2001).     
 
4. Who is better off?   A simple conceptual framework  
 
  In this section we set up a simple conceptual framework to answer the following 
question: will all workers equally benefit from the tax credit? In other words, will firms 
choose to hire all types of workers, regardless of their observable characteristics? The 
simple framework we use suggests this is not the case. It shows indeed that the best 
workers (in terms of their observable characteristics) will be most probably hired with 
open-end contracts. These workers are those the firm would have most likely hired on a 
permanent basis even in the absence of this subsidy, perhaps after a period of temporary 
employment. At the same time less able workers would not be affected by the new tax 
credit and could be even harmed by it. 
 
4.1 Setting 
Suppose the firm does not know the productivity of new workers. Let y be worker’s 
productivity when matched with a job and assume this value is drawn from one out of the 
following two alternative productivity distributions G(y): either a uniform [0,yH] or a 
uniform [0,yL]. To make things simpler, let us assume the second distribution is 
degenerate to 0. 
 
Given workers’ observable characteristics, each firm assigns to each new worker a 
probability  λ to be drawn from [0,yH ]. There exist two types of contracts in this 
economy, namely fixed-term and open-end contracts. They both last two periods. With   13 
the first type firms hire a new worker in the first period, observe her/his productivity and 
then decide whether to hire the worker for the second period or let her/him go. In this last 
case no firing cost has to be born. We finally assume that in the second period there is no 
need to fire the worker. 
 
With the second type of contract (open-end contract), firms face the same sequence of 
decisions: they hire a new worker in the first period, observe her/his productivity and then 
decide whether to hire the worker or let her/him go. However, in the latter case a firing 
cost has to be born. As in the fixed-term case, in the second period there is no need to fire 
the worker. Wages are exogenously given to firms
10. 
 
4.2 The value of contracts 
In order to decide which contract to offer to each worker, firms need to compute the value 
of both contracts.  
The value to a firm of a fixed-term contract is given by: 
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that is the sum of the expected profits from the two periods. Second period expected 
profits depend on the probability that workers will be retained and on the expected 
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and  FT y is the cut-off level of productivity below which a firm fires the worker. 
Each firm has to choose this cut-off level of productivity ( FT y ) and needs to compute 
the threshold λ below which the contract value turns out to be negative (so that no worker 
                                                 
10 We remove this assumption later on.   14 
with an attached λ below this threshold is going to be hired). The optimal value of cut-off 
productivity is 2
* w yFT =  
11.  This implies that the firm will enjoy extra profits for any 
worker retained in the second period. The threshold value for λ is 
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To make sense this value needs to be less than one
12. 
 
The value to a firm of an open-end contract is instead: 
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where C is the firing cost.  The only difference between this value and the one assigned to 
a fixed-term contract is the expected firing cost () C hired P * ) ( 1 − , which has to be born 
at the end of the first period. 
Given our productivity assumptions, the following holds for an open-end contract 
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The value of this contract is then maximum when  
 
C ) r ( w y
*
OE + − = 1 2                                                                                       (4) 
 
Notice that this value lies below that of fixed-term contracts; thus firms would retain in 
the second period a worker, who would be fired in case of temporary employment. This 
happens because when the firm retains a worker it saves on firing costs. With this cut-off 
productivity value, the threshold for the probability λ turns out to be 
 
                                                 
11 This value is derived by maximizing the value function with respect to  FT y .   15 
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which is always greater than the threshold corresponding to fixed-term contracts.     
 
Notice moreover that bearable firing costs have an upper bound, that is  
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that derives from the observation that the lowest value of  *
OE y is zero.  
 
Using the fact that C ) r ( y C ) r ( w y
*
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OE + − = + − = 1 1 2 , it is possible to write the value 
of one contract as a function of the value of the other one, i.e.  
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This relationship is shown in Graph 1. 
Graph 1: the Labor Market Before the Subsidy  
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for the second period.  
λ
1
()
() r y
y y
w
y
V
H
FT H H
FT +
−
+ − =
1 2 2
*
1  
-w1
-w1-c
  λ*OE  λ*FT
Unemployed  Fixed Term 
() () c
y
y r c
V V
H
FT
FT OE  


 

 − +
+ = = =
2
2 ) 1 (
1 1
*
λ λ  16 
Two facts are here worth noting. The first one is that open-end contracts are dominated 
by fixed-term contracts for every value of λ; this result captures in a simple way the idea 
that all new workers enter employment with a fixed-term job, a feature which does not 
appear too far from the Italian experience in the 1990s
13.  The second noticeable fact is 
that the slope of the value of open-end contracts with respect to the quality index λ is 
higher than the correspondent slope for fixed-term contracts. In other words as λ 
increases, the value of the first contract grows faster than the value of the second one. 
This happens because of the reduction in the expected firing costs.  However, this second 
effect does not overcome the reduction in the overall values due to firing costs.        
 
4.3 The effect of the subsidy 
Let us now introduce the subsidy to open-end contracts in the form of a lump sum K 
given in the first period to each firm hiring workers with such contracts. Thus, the value 
of an open-end contract will be shifted upwards by an amount K for any given level of λ: 
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If the subsidy is nor too small or too high
14, the value of an open-end contract will be 
shifted in such a way to ensure the coexistence of the unemployed, fixed-term contracts 
and open-end contracts (Graph 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Admittedly only about half of the newly hired workers (those who are not job switchers) are open-end  
contracts. This is due to the fact that  firms are not allowed to hire as many workers as they wish under 
fixed-term contracts because of the existence of  contractual upper limits to the adoption of  temporary 
contracts.     
14 In particular the lowest level of K has to be such that VOE –VFT > 0 when evaluated at λ=1; this value is 
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Graph 2: The Labor Market after the Reform 
 
 
The decision rule implied by this new setting is: 
- Do not offer workers any contract if   λ ≤   λ*FT; 
- Offer a fixed-term contract if λ*FT   < λ  ≤   λ* ;   
- Offer an open-end contract if λ*  <  λ  ;   
Thus, newly hired open-end workers are those the firm assigns the highest probability λ 
and are probably those who are most likely retained in the second period. This result does 
not come as a surprise given that firms try to balance off the subsidy (that is identical for 
all workers) with the additional expected firing costs; since these costs are smaller for 
expected better workers, these are the ones preferred by firms. Thus, the policy 
intervention we are examining seems to foster the probability of being permanently 
employed for people who have the highest chance to be employed in permanent jobs 
regardless the subsidy. 
  
4.4 Extensions  
This paragraph is devoted to illustrate what happens to the model if we allow for an 
endogenous wage in the second period. In this section we present the major results
15. The 
criterion we adopted to let the wage be determined within the model is the fact that in the 
second period wages are equal to the outside opportunities for workers as measured by 
the average productivity of not employed workers.  With this rule, before the introduction 
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of the subsidy there exists a unique equilibrium and the wage turns out to be a value 
lower than the expected productivity of workers and the quality index threshold is 
different than zero.   
 
Results are less clean when we introduce the subsidy. In this case the model might have 
either no equilibrium, or one or two equilibria. However this last case can be ruled out on 
the basis that we are interested in those equilibria in which both contracts are 
implemented.  
 
The last question we address concerns the comparison between pre- and post-subsidy 
wages. Results show that pre-reform wages are higher than post-reform ones. This effect 
depends on the fact that, because of the firing costs, the productivity threshold for an 
open-end contract turns out to be lower. Thus, the major effect of endogenous wages is 
given by the fact that, by lowering the overall wage, the subsidy has a small effect on 
total employment.    
 
5. The Data. 
In order to verify whether the new subsidy has having any effect on the level and 
composition of new workers’ flow, we resorted to the Labor Force Survey and defined as 
new hires those employees who have been holding their current job for less than 13 
months
16. In particular, computations have been carried out on data deriving from the 
October 2001 wave of the Italian LFS. Thus, all new workers selected from this survey 
are potentially covered by the new subsidy (since it was granted starting from October 
2000).  To avoid problems related to seasonal patterns, we chose the October survey of 
every year comprised in our sample (i.e. from 1993 on). Finally, we only included new 
hires into the private, no farm sector
17.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
15 The formal development of the model is long and space consuming. Thus we report it in Appendix 2.  
16 To compute this tenure variable we used the question “When did you begin to work with the current 
employer?” 
17 To be precise we excluded sectors (“branca di attività economica”) coded “01” and “10” in the LFS.    19 
These selection rules leave us with a number of observations that ranges from a lowest 
3593 in 1993 (representing just over 1 million new hires) to a highest 5474 in 2000 
(representing 1.6 million new workers, Table 6).  In 2001, less than two-thirds of new 
workers were hired with open-end contracts. This share was 71 per cent in 1993. This 
decline has been mirrored by a corresponding increase in fixed-term contracts of the 
Apprenticeship and Work and Training type, whose share went from 8.2 in 1993 to 14.4 
in 2000, before falling to 10.8 per cent in 2001
18. Fixed-term contracts due to lack of 
better opportunities represented a steady 15 per cent of all new contracts.  In 2001, 53 per 
cent of new workers were males. This share was about 60 per cent at the beginning of the 
1990s and has been constantly declining since. More than 50 per cent of newly hired 
workers were less than 30 years old (60 per cent in 1993), and their decline is due to 
workers younger that 20, only partially compensated by workers in their twenties.   It is 
interesting to note that a steady 10 per cent of new hires consists of workers 45 years and 
older. 
 
From 1993 to 2001, the share of newly hired workers with a low level of education 
(lower secondary school or less) declined of about 14 percentage points. At the same time 
the shares of high school and college graduates rose respectively of about 10 and 5 
percentage points. Most of the growth was driven by the service sector.  
 
6. A preliminary look at the evidence. 
This section provides a preliminary evidence that firms most probably used the tax credit 
to selectively hire under open-end contracts only particular types of workers who, 
according to their own observable characteristics, look the most suitable to be hired into 
permanent jobs regardless the subsidy. In this preliminary presentation of the evidence 
we look at the share of both new open-end contracts by age and level of education and 
fixed-term contracts by reasons for holding such a contract.   
 
                                                 
18 In May 1999 the European Commission established that Work and Training contracts for people older 
than 25 (29 for people with a college degree) could no longer be granted the entire social contribution 
reduction. There is some evidence that this provision has reduced the number of these contracts in the year 
2000.    20 
6.1 Question one: did the share of new open-end contracts increase? 
Our simple model suggests that, because of the new subsidy, the share of open-end 
contracts should have gone up. The first question we pose is therefore whether in 2001 
there has been an increase in the share of open-end contracts and, perhaps more 
importantly, whether this increase has been stronger for the eligible workers (i.e. people 
25 years and older) than for the remaining groups.  Table 6 answers the first part of the 
question, as it shows that the share of open-end contracts increased of 2 percentage points 
(from 62.5 to 64.5) between 2000 and 2001. This synchronism is particularly remarkable 
since before 2000 this share was declining almost steadily.   
To answer the second part of the question figure 7 tries to evaluate which worker group 
turns out to be responsible for this increase. The figure plots the share of open-end 
contracts for different age groups between 1993 and 2001. Again, one could read the rise 
in the share for all workers. However, we found evidence that the share for the eligible 
workers (25 years and older) increased slightly more than the control group (workers less 
than 25 years old). Most of the growth in the share of the eligible group is due to the 
youngest people: the share of workers 25 to 40 years old went from 64.3 to 67.5 per cent,  
that is 1.2 percentage points above the average increase.    
  
To summarize, two main facts can be recorded: i) the share of open-end contracts 
increased between 2000 to 2001, thereby inverting a previous declining trend; ii) the 
treated group – especially the younger component - enjoyed a  slightly higher growth 
than the control group. Both results square with our priors.     
 
6.2 Question two: for which group did the share of new open-end contracts increase? 
Evidence from the years of schooling 
 
What kind of workers did the firm hire with open-end contracts in 2001? Figure 8 tries to 
answer this question by comparing the average number of schooling years of, 
respectively, new permanent and new fixed-term workers between 1993 and 2001. The 
relative level of education of permanent workers declined until 1995, with a small 
recovery in the following years even if the overall changes were quite small until 1999. In   21 
2000, people with more years of schooling entered open-end contracts more frequently 
than before, bringing about the first sizable rise in the overall level of education for these 
contracts.  In 2001 an analogous increase took place. Thus, it may appear that the 
increase in the relative quality of open-end contracts preceded the subsidy. Nonetheless, a 
closer look at the age composition reveals that in the year 2000 there was an almost equal 
size increases in both treated (eligible) and control groups (less than 25 years old). By 
contrast, in 2001 relative education remained constant for the control group while it rose 
further for the treated group, especially for the older ones (40 years and older).   
 
This evidence seems therefore to support the idea that, compared to the previous years, in 
2001 firms chose to hire under open-end contracts people with more years of education. 
This increase was however limited to people 25 years and older.     
   
 6.3 Question two: for which group did the share of new open-end contracts increase? 
Evidence from the age distribution  
Figure 9 shows the age distribution of new open-end contracts as a share of total new 
hires.  We divided the overall share into 5-year-brackets, ranging from 15 to 65 years old. 
The sum over the 10-age-brackets gives the total share plotted in figure 7. The overall age 
structure appears stable overtime, except for the decline in the share of the 19-24 age 
group and the rise of the 25-29 year olds in 2001. The latter increase is remarkable both 
in size and given the relative stability of the previous years.  
 
6.4 Question three: what type of fixed-term contract declined?   
Figure 10 illustrates the share of fixed-term contracts by reasons for holding such a 
contract among workers 25 years and older (the category “other reasons” includes the 
answer “don’t want an open-end contract”). The crucial fact to note here is that the drop 
in the total share is not evenly distributed across contract types but is fully concentrated 
in the Apprenticeship and Work and Training category.  In the previous years (at least 
since 1993), this type of fixed-term contracts never declined. 
This pattern can be interpreted as an indication of the fact that firms, while hiring more 
people with open-end contracts, selected those workers they would have alternatively   22 
hired with a Work and Training Contract, which usually represents the main avenue 
towards permanent employment. Thus, this might imply that firms used the subsidy to 
anticipate what they would have done later on.  
However, it must be stressed that a part of this decline could also be the consequence of 
the 1999 provision of the European Commission, recalled in footnote 18. The major 
effect of such a provision should have been recorded in the year 2000 rather than in 2001, 
but we can anyway allow for this additional explanation without altering the basic 
message of our conclusion.        
       
7. The effects of the subsidy on the probability of being hired with an open-end 
contract  
 
7.1 Empirical specification and identification strategy   
In this section we use a simple econometric model to evaluate whether the subsidy 
exherted any causal effect on the probability of being permanently hired. We want to 
address two specific questions: 1) did the subsidy increase the probability of being hired 
with an open-end contract? And if so, by how much? 2) was the effect stronger for people 
with higher probability to access lasting jobs (even in the absence of the subsidy)? The 
econometric specification adopted to answer these two questions is a simple probit 
model, in which the probability of being hired with an open-end contract depends on age, 
education and a series of other demographic characteristics, year dummies and a dummy 
that takes value 1 if the worker is eligible for the subsidy and zero otherwise. We also 
include an interaction between this dummy and the worker’s schooling years:      
( ) β β β β
'
it x ) tract openendCon Hiredwitha Pr( Φ =  
s yeardummie stics characteri   demografic
) age , educ ( g educ * Treated Treated x
it
it it it it 2 it 1 o
'
it
+ + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + = = = = β β β β β β β β β β β β β β β β
   (1) 
 
The value of the coefficient β1 provides an answer to question 1, as it measures the 
average additional effect of being eligible for the subsidy on the probability of being 
hired with a permanent contract.  The value of the coefficient β2 provides instead an 
answer to question 2 if we are willing to assume that education is an indicator of the   23 
likelihood to be hired with an open-end contract. It measures the additional effect (over 
β1) of having a given level of education.   
 
On the basis of both our conceptual framework and the preliminary look at the evidence 
we expect both coefficients to be positive, implying that the subsidy increased the 
chances to be hired with an open-end contract with a stronger effect on more educated 
people.     
 
Before turning to the actual estimation of the empirical model we still need to clarify two 
issues. The first one deals with the conditioning population we are referring to in 
estimating equation (1).  As we explained in the data description section, we only have 
access to cross-section data and cannot therefore evaluate transitions from different labor 
market status into employment. We are able to identify new hires because of a specific 
question in the survey but we do not know where do they come from. They could be 
transiting indeed from any status into employment, including from open-end to open-end 
contracts. Given this sample limitation we decided to lower our expectations and asked a 
simpler question, namely we looked at the effect of the tax credit on the probability of 
being hired with an open-end contract, conditional on having been hired in the past 12 
months. This implies that we restricted our sample to the population that has actually 
been hired in the preceding 12 months.  
 
The second issue refers to the strategy we used to identify β1 and β2. Here several 
approaches can be adopted; they are summarized in Table 7. The first strategy, referred to 
as W1, exploits only overtime differences in the share of open-end contracts for the 
treated group, which in this case we assume to include all workers 25 years and older. 
Thus the effect of the subsidy in 2001 would be the difference between this year and a 
reference year in the share of open-end contracts for the treated group. The second 
strategy, referred to as W2, is also a within age group strategy and identifies the effect of 
the subsidy as the difference between the value of the coefficient in 2001 and the 
corresponding value in another reference year. It differs from W1 in that it restricts the 
treated group to workers 25 to 35 years old who, we believe, should be more sensitive to   24 
the new regulation. However, these strategies might deliver very misleading results if the 
rise in the probability of being hired with open-end contracts were also shared by other 
age groups that cannot be affected by the subsidy, namely workers younger than 25. In 
this case there should be some other reason, common to all workers, which explains the 
registered increase.  
 
To control for those possibly common effects we include in the sample people who do 
not belong to the treated group. The next three strategies, referred to as AW1, AW2 and 
AW3, serve this purpose. Here the identification relies on both within (different effects 
for the same group overtime) and across age group (different effects across groups in the 
same year). In particular strategy AW1 is a “diff and diff” estimator that identifies the 
effect of the subsidy as the change, in year 2000 with respect to some reference year, of 
the difference between the effect of cohort “25 and older” and the cohort “younger than 
25”. Strategy AW2 is also a diff and diff estimator that uses as treated group only 
workers 25 to 35 years old in 2001 and as control group the remaining workers between 
15 and 65 years old. Finally, the strategy AW3 is similar to AW2 except for the control 
group only including people older than 35.   
 
Before turning to the results, we want to stress a last point: while our sample is not well 
suited to estimate the effect of the subsidy on the unconditional probability to be hired 
with a permanent contract, we could still provide an approximated evaluation of its 
impact on the overall level of employment in 2001 for the treated group. This is what we 
did in paragraph 7.5, where we estimated the effect of the new regulation on the 
probability to be hired as an employee in the 12 months preceding October 2001. The 
corresponding sample was then extended to include every potentially eligible person, i.e. 
everybody who, in the previous 12 months, was not working in a permanent position. 
     
 
 
7.2 Results.   25 
Before taking model (1) to the data we need to specify the function g() and comment on 
the demographic characteristics that have been included. The g() function  is specified as 
a cubic in age, a quadratic in schooling and the interaction between the two variables. The 
demographics include gender, regional dummies and marital status. We estimate such a 
model under all 5 strategies presented in table 7.  Results are shown in table 8.  
 
The overall message coming out from the 5 models is that, when the reference year is 
2000, the average effect (β1) is zero for an average worker, while the effect is more 
relevant for the youngest among the eligible workers.  
 
In detail, results suggest that in 2001 the probability of being hired with an open-end 
contract went up anything between 0.7 to 4.2 percentage points depending on the model 
chosen (heading “Treated” in the table). The effect would be smaller (often negative), 
had we chosen as reference a year before 1998. Moreover, only in two out of five cases 
the coefficient is statistically different from zero. The average effect is clearly zero in the 
AW1 model; this means that for the average worker the subsidy did not change the 
probability of being hired as a permanent worker when considering that people younger 
than 25 experienced a similar increase, even without being affected by the subsidy. 
However, when we restrict the treated group to people between 25 and 35, we find a 
bigger effect both in the overtime comparison (2 percentage points in model W2) and in 
the “diff and diff” specification (3.3 in model AW2). This result means that the subsidy 
did not have any effect on people older than 35 even if they were eligible. It also explains 
why we did not find any effect of the subsidy in model AW1: the effect for the 25-35 
year olds is washed out by the lack of impact on older workers. This explanation is 
supported by the results of the AW3 model, where we directly compare only subgroups 
of the eligible population. For an average worker aged 25 to 35 years the probability of 
being hired in a permanent job went up of 4.2 percentage points between 2000 and 2001 
when compared to a worker 36 or older.   
 
There might be an alternative explanation for these differences in the effect of the subsidy 
across age groups that is based on the fact that we measure our treated group with errors.    26 
We know that some new hires among people 25 years and older are indeed not eligible 
for the subsidy because they are just moving between two permanent positions. If the 
variance of this measurement error turns out to be large, it might be seriously attenuating 
the average effects of the subsidy. If these movers between permanent positions are 
particularly concentrated among older workers, say those older than 35, the effect of the 
subsidy estimated for younger workers represents more a measure of the attenuation bias 
due to a measurement error, rather than a hint on firms’ age preferences. We will come 
back to this issue later on.  
 
When we address the second question - whether the effect of the subsidy significantly 
differs across workers (β2, heading “treated*educ” in the table) - we get a clearer answer: 
one year of education above the average increases the probability to be a permanent 
worker of 1 percentage point. This marginal effect implies that for a college graduate the 
probability was between 7 and 9 percentage points higher in 2001 compared with the 
1990s; for a high school graduate this increase was about 2-3 percentage points. For less 
educated workers, instead, these estimates suggest the effect might even be negative: for 
a lower secondary graduate the probability reduction consists of about 2 to 3 percentage 
points with respect to average workers, which implies, with respect to 2000, an overall 
small negative effect (including β1).  In sharp contrast with the average effect, the 
interaction between treatment and schooling effect (β2) is very stable across specifications 
(it ranges from .96 to 1.2 percentage points) and always precisely estimated. 
One additional comment on table 8 is necessary to explain the negative slope of the 
education variable on the probability to be hired with a permanent contract. The effect is 
due essentially to the fact that, by controlling for age, workers with more years of 
schooling, compared to workers with less education, either have been searching for 
shorter time or are facing their first work experience, which is more likely to occur in a 
temporary job. 
 
 
 
   27 
7.3 Robustness checks 
 
7.3.1. Check of the functional form 
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results we estimated equation (1) with a fully 
non parametric specification that allows for one dummy for each age, level of schooling 
and the interaction of the two sets of dummies; in addition we include gender, regional 
and marital status as well as year effects. However we regrouped the schooling variable 
in three levels: college or more, high school, lower secondary school or less
19.   
 
This fully non-parametric specification seems to confirm most of the results of the more 
structured model (table 9). The effect for people with at most a lower secondary 
education (which in this specification can be directly read looking at the heading 
“treated”) is zero in all but AW1 specification where it is negative but still poorly 
estimated. The effects for high school graduates range from 3 to 4.6 percentage points. 
Larger values are found when we restrict the treated cohort to younger workers (25-35 
years old). However the small t-stats of these estimates point to the fact that, again, the 
effects are weak. In contrast, the effects are stronger and precisely estimated when we 
look at college graduates. For this group, estimates range from 10.4 to 11 percentage 
points.  
 
7.3.2. Check of the identification strategies  
We run an additional set of controls that address the following question. We need to be 
sure that the effects we have identified in 2001 for the treated cohort were absent in the 
years immediately before, say in 2000 and 1999. Otherwise the additional probability of 
being hired with an open-end contract cannot be attributed to the subsidy, which has been 
in force only from October 2000. To carry out this control we estimated equation (1) 
under the same specification discussed above but adding to every year (1993 to 2000) a 
dummy for the same group of people who, in 2001, were eligible for the subsidy. We also 
include the usual interaction with the years of schooling. This specification allows us to 
                                                 
19  College or more also includes degrees granted after 2-3 years of college studies (Diplomi Universitari e 
Lauree Brevi); high school also includes technical high school degrees, which are acquired in 2 or 3 years 
rather than the usual 5 ones following lower secondary education.     28 
estimate one β1 and one β2 for every single year comprised in our sample (i.e. from 1993 
to 2001); thus a direct comparison of this marginal effect would provide an answer to our 
concerns. In table 10 we report the results of this estimation for all our strategies.  
 
For the average effects (β1), table 10 tells about the same story of the previous two tables.  
When we use only within age group differences (models W1 and W2) we obtain virtually 
the same results of the previous model since β1 is simply the year effect. The estimates of 
the effect for the year 2001 are small, positive (1.8 and 2.9 per cent increases in the 
probability) and hardly different from zero; however they compare with a zero effect for 
the years going from 1998 to 2000.  Again the effects are stronger when we exclude older 
workers from the treated group. The effect in 2001 is not different from the previous 
years when we include in the control group workers 15-24 years old (model AW1), 
meaning that the small increases we registered for the treated group in model W1 and W2 
were not specific to that group. In contrast, in the remaining two models (AW2, AW3) 
the small average effect is still there in the new specification. Indeed we find a positive 
marginal effect in the years 1998-2000, but the difference between 2001 and the average 
of these previous years remains in the order of magnitude of 1 to 2.4 percentage points.   
 
Results change instead when we look at the interaction with the years of schooling. Two 
results need to be highlighted: the marginal effect for the year 2001 - with respect to 2000 
- of the interaction term halves with respect to the estimate in table 8
20 and it seems to be 
the case that firms began to hire people with higher schooling level even before the 
subsidy was in place.  These results apparently weaken our story. However the rises in 
the marginal effect for the year 2000 can be fully accounted for with the sharp rises in the 
labor demand, mainly in the northern regions of the country: firms facing labor force 
scarcity competed over workers by offering permanent contracts. Whatever the reasons 
behind the year 2000 rise might be, it is interesting to note that firms selected again 
better-educated workers. This suggests that the best educated workers turn out to be those 
who exploit more promptly the favorable shifts in the probability of being hired in a 
                                                 
20 The differences between 2001and 2000 vary from 0.5 to 0.7 in the 5 models.     29 
permanent position. In some sense this observation can represent an implicit confirmation 
of our story.  
 
Before providing statistical evidence of this labor demand explanation we want to make 
one more comment on table 10. The interaction effect is smaller than that of table 8 when 
referred to the year 2000, but is equal or even stronger when referred to almost every 
other year. Thus, if we can provide an explanation for 2000 results we have also 
confirmed the results of table 8.  
 
To ground our speculation for the year 2000 into statistical evidence we have run two 
additional tests: the first one entails re-estimating the model (we chose specification 
AW1) after adding to the specification of table 10 a set of interaction effects between 
treated, years of schooling, and northern regions. The idea is to use the northern regions 
dummies to control for labor shortage that was most severe in these areas (Fig.11). With 
this new specification the effect for the year 2000 disappears: the marginal effect for that 
year is identical to that of the previous years (1.04 in 2000, 0.95 in 1999 and 1.12 in 
1998, see column three of table 11). At the same time the dummy for the year 2000 in the 
northern area is the highest in the whole period (it was zero in that year and about -0.01 
per cent in the preceding period). Moreover the marginal effect for the year 2001 rises of 
about 0.3 percentage points compared to the basic specification; the difference with the 
year 2000 goes back to about 1 percentage point for every additional year of education 
above the average, that is the basic value we found in table 8.  
 
In the second test we directly use an indicator of labor shortage to control for labor 
demand. The indicator is the share of firms in the manufacturing sector that in the forth 
quarter of each year registered difficulties in recruiting workers. It is plotted in Figure 11. 
Using the interaction of this indicator with the years of schooling, we obtain about the 
same result of the previous control specification. The year 2000 effect disappears and the 
gap between 2001 and 2000 is again around 1 percentage point for every additional year 
of schooling.   
   30 
Overall we read the outcomes of our robustness checks as supportive of our results that 
we have summarized in figure 12. In synthesis we believe that these results suggest firms 
did use the subsidy to hire new workers with open-end contracts but they were very 
selective in choosing workers. The differences in the average effect (β1) across the five 
specifications suggest they mostly hired young workers (25 to 35 years old), and the 
interaction between treated group and years of schooling tells they mostly selected highly 
educated people. Since this group is the most likely to hold a permanent contract, 
regardless the subsidy, our results might suggest that the new subsidy fostered the 
probability of being hired with a permanent contract of those people who would have 
been hired in such a position even without financial support. In other words the new 
incentive did not created additional opportunities to enter permanent jobs for everybody 
but rather for the strongest group in the labor market .  
   
7.4 The effects on the probability to be hired 
In this section we investigate whether the tax credit, while not improving the relative 
position of the least educated workers, did improve the overall hiring rate in the year 
2001 for the treated group.  To this end we estimated the probability to be hired in the 
preceding 12 months as a function of some worker’s demographic characteristics, year 
dummies and a dummy that indicates if the worker is eligible for the tax credit: 
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We estimated this equation on a sample that was extracted from the October releases of 
the 1993-2001 Labor Force Surveys and includes all people aged 15 to 65 who were 
either hired in the last 12 months, or are alternatively self-employed, unemployed or out 
of the labor force.  Notice that we included among new hires the permanent to permanent 
switchers and excluded from the sample workers having held a permanent position for 
more than 12 months. This sample selection could generate an overestimation of the   31 
possible positive employment effect of the subsidy. We adopted an identical specification 
to that of equation (1), but we left out the interaction between the eligibility status and the 
years of education. We estimated equation (2) under the 5 identification strategies 
reported in table 7.  Results are presented in table 12.   
 
Table 12 shows the effect of the tax credit on the probability to be hired in the period 
ranging from October 2000 to October 2001. The overall message is that it did not 
change the probability to be hired in 2001 compared to the year 2000.  The “diff and diff” 
estimator using the whole sample (model AW1) shows that the tax credit increased the 
chances to be hired of 0.3 percentage points, a very small number if compared to the 
mean of the dependent variable  (10.2 per cent) and statistically not different from zero. 
The effect is small even if we compare the treated group with itself overtime: in model 
W1 the marginal effect is 0.2 percentage points while the corresponding likelihood to be 
hired is about 10.6 per cent. The tax credit seems to have had some effect only for the 25-
35 year olds and only compared to older workers: in model W2 we estimate an overtime 
effect of 1 per cent (17.7 per cent is the average likelihood to be hired), in model AW3 
the “diff and diff” estimate is 0.5 percentage points. But even for this group, the “diff and 
diff” estimate drops to zero when we include in the control group people at most 24 years 
old.   
 
To sum up, the introduction of the tax credit does not seem to have increased the overall 
probability to be hired in 2001 with respect to the previous year. This result reinforces 
our previous conclusions, according to which the major impact of the new provision has 
been almost exclusively a pure substitution effect between temporary and open-end 
contracts. However, these higher chances to step into permanent jobs seem to have been 
limited to better-educated workers. 
   
 
 
7.5 Indications of dead-weight losses    32 
Throughout the whole paper we have been claiming that firms chose to hire under open-
end contracts those workers they would have anyway hired, regardless the subsidy. We 
have provided some bits of evidence to support this claim. Figures presented in Table 4 
suggest that people with more years of schooling have higher chances to move eventually 
into an open-end contract. Additional evidence is provided in Table 10, which shows a 
higher probability to be hired with an open-end contract among people with a higher level 
of education even before 2001. We also emphasized how a favorable shift in labor 
demand tends to be better exploited by more educated people.  
 
In this paragraph we reinforce these indications through a complete analysis of the 
observed transitions between different labor market status, whose results tend to confirm 
that better educated people have indeed higher chances to end up working in permanent 
positions. 
 
To this end we use some additional information provided by a special data set, covering a 
panel of workers who have been observed for two subsequent periods, namely from 1999 
to 2000. This special data source has been constructed by Italian statistical office 
(ISTAT) by matching workers across surveys, thereby exploiting six key variables that 
either do not change overtime or vary in a deterministic and perfectly predictable way
21.  
Because of the rotation mechanism characterizing the sample (a “two in, two out, two in” 
scheme), we can look at transitions on a quarterly and annual basis. Unfortunately, 
transition data are presently available only for the period 1999 to 2000.  
 
We exploited the annual matches (pooling together the matches relative to the four 
quarters of every year) to construct a matrix of transitions among the existing labor 
market status. This matrix was then used to construct the equilibrium distribution among 
the labor market status of 100 people who, at time zero, were out of the labor force.  
Formally, we iterated the following equation 30 times starting from an initial vector V0 
with all elements equal to zero except for the out of the labor force status that equals 100: 
                                                 
21 This data-set is not available to the general public. We are allowed to use it because it was exploited in a 
joint research project between ISTAT and the Bank of Italy      33 
t t V T V   1 = +  
where T is the transition matrix with the generic elements Tij representing the probability 
of moving from state j (at time t) to state i (at time t+1).  We allowed for the maximum 
detail by considering 11 labor market statuses (open-end contracts, Work and Training 
fixed-term contracts, fixed-term contracts due to lack of better opportunities, freely 
chosen fixed-term contracts, fixed-term contracts due to a trial period, other fixed-term 
contracts, self-employment, unemployment because of firing, unemployment after 
entering the labor market for the first time, other unemployed people, out of the labor 
force).   
 
Our exercise entails estimating and comparing several equilibrium distributions, one for 
every schooling level. In particular we estimated an equilibrium distribution for people 
with at most a lower secondary diploma (8
th grade), another one for people with a high 
school degree and a third one for college graduates. Panel (a) of Figure 13 reports the 
four equilibrium distributions (we aggregated fixed-terms contracts as well as 
unemployment), the first three ones referring to every single education level and the last 
one covering the aggregate category.  The evidence seems to support our claim.   
Compared to people holding at most a lower secondary diploma, high school graduates 
show indeed a 24 per cent higher probability to end up working in an open-end contract. 
A college degree further increases this chance by about 4 percentage points. Moreover, 
higher educated people have a much higher chance to be employed in general, no matter 
if they work as employees or self-employed (i.e. their overall employment rate is higher 
compared to less educated workers); this especially happens to those holding a college 
degree.  
 
It might appear uncomfortable that, compared to a high school diploma, a college degree 
turns out to increase the chance to work with an open-end contract by only 4 percentage 
points.  The reason behind this apparently disappointing result is that many college 
graduates work as professionals (e.g. lawyers, accountants, physicians as well as 
engineers). This implies that if working arrangements required this kind of occupations to 
be organized within a firm with a traditional subordinate labor contract, then the share of   34 
college graduates employed with an open-end contract would appear to be much higher. 
An indirect way to support this last claim is to look at the same evidence broken down by 
gender. Since professionals look more represented among male college graduates, the 
college-high school spread in the probability to work with a permanent contract should be 
lower for males (in Figure 13, panel (b), it is actually negative), than for females (10 
percentage points, as shown by Figure 13, panel (c)). 
 
7.6 Check on measurement errors  
Our data set is a collection of surveys that prevents us from measuring people transitions 
among different labor market status.  This feature does not allow us to identify whether or 
not a newly hired person was eligible for the subsidy. We have overcome this 
shortcoming by assuming that all people newly hire between October 2000 and  October 
2001 were eligible as long as they were at least 25 years old. This implies that we are 
measuring the eligibility status with an error, since new hires also include people moving 
between two permanent jobs, who are therefore not eligible for the subsidy.  
 
Measurement errors for the eligibility status may be responsible for the weak average 
effects estimated in Table 8 and may also underestimate the interaction with schooling. In 
order to address this problem we resort to an instrumental variable estimation method. 
The instrument we use is the share of the people who, in October 2000, would have been 
eligible for the subsidy. Practically, we divided the October 2000 sample into cells 
showing the intersection of age, gender and region (50*2*19); for every cell we 
computed the share of people who were not employed in permanent positions with 
respect to total cell population.  
We use this indicator and its interaction with the school variable to estimate with 
instrumental variables the usual 5 models with the same specification adopted in table 8. 
Results are presented in Table 13.  To make comparison easier, we also estimated the 5 
different strategies with a linear probability model in order to highlight the slope 
variations generated by the changes in the functional form (i.e. from probit to linear 
model) as well as those due to the instrumental variables. 
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Using a linear probability model (with robust standard error) hardly changes any of the 
existing slopes. Instrumental variables, instead, marginally change the coefficient and in 
all but one case they appear to increase the slopes. This upward revision is coherent with 
the idea that the dummy used to indicate the eligibility status is affected by measurement 
errors, which, however, appear to be small. In most cases, average effects (shown under 
the label “treated” in Table 13) tend to rise by about a half percentage point, while the 
interaction coefficient changes at most by one fifth of a decimal point. The largest change 
occurs in model AW3 (where the treated group is restricted to people 25 to 35 years old). 
In this case the average effect increases from 4 to 5.2 per cent (and the interaction rises 
from 1 to 1.2 per cent). On the one hand, this result suggests the attenuation bias mostly 
affects younger workers; on the other hand it indicates that instrumental variable 
estimates tend to reinforce our conclusion that firms prefer to hire on a permanent basis 
young and well educated  people.          
 
 
8. Conclusions.  
 
In this paper we examined the effects of a new normative provision put forward in Italy at 
the end of 2000 to foster employment with open-end rather than fixed-term contracts. We 
provided basic information about temporary contracts in Italy; in addition we explained 
why they might be a source of concern and how policy-makers are trying to reduce their 
negative effects while retaining their positive sides. One attempt in this direction has been 
the introduction of the tax credit we examined in this paper. The effects of this new 
provision have been examined both formally and empirically. Two basic questions have 
been addressed, namely whether the new incentive has created additional opportunities to 
enter permanent jobs, and whether these chances have either been available for every 
worker or rather limited to specific groups. In other words we asked whether firms did 
take advantage of government’s financial support by anticipating the employment of 
people they would have anyway hired regardless the incentive. 
   36 
Our analytical and empirical framework is not specific to the Italian case and might prove 
to be useful to analyze similar programs that have been adopted in many other European 
countries in order to foster hiring into permanent rather than temporary employment. 
  
Results seem to indicate that, while overall employment probability did not change, firms 
used this subsidy to hire on a permanent basis mostly young and well-educated workers; 
perhaps those who would have been hired with such contracts regardless the subsidy, 
even though after a short transition into temporary employment. Our estimates suggest 
that, compared to the previous year, in 2001 the subsidy did indeed increase the 
probability of being hired with an open-end contract, conditional on being hired, but in a 
rather uneven way across workers. The probability rose by about 10 per cent for workers 
holding a college degree, by about 4 per cent for people with a high school diploma, 
while did not change or might have even slightly declined for less educated workers. The 
empirical evidence squares with formal prediction. 
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Appendix 1: Fixed Term Contract Regulation, historical overview  
 
1. The origins of fixed-term contracts  
 
According to the Italian labor law, open-end contracts have always been the rule. 
However, in the 1920s Italian legislation already provided for the possibility to set a time 
limitation to labor contracts, the only condition being the existence of a “special relation” 
between employer and employee
22.  This provision was then included in the 1942 Civil 
Code (atr.2097). Originally, the adoption of contracts of limited duration implied strong 
differences in worker treatment: according to the Private employment act of 1924 and, 
later on, to the first version of the 1942 Civil Code, fixed-term workers were not entitled 
to most of the rights an open-end worker usually had (e.g. holidays, longevity pay, 
Christmas bonus). In order to avoid the fraudulent use of these flexible contracts
23, in 
1962 a specific legislation for fixed-term contracts (l.230/1962) was introduced, which 
established a general ban for the adoption of fixed-term contracts except for a very 
specific list of circumstances, namely
24: i) seasonal activities
25; ii) temporary replacement 
of an employee on leave; iii) occasional activities which are time predetermined and not 
usually carried out from the firm; iv) special contracts, requiring skills that are not usually 
provided by the firm; v) top management.  Therefore, instead of representing a valid 
                                                 
22 See art.1, co.2, R.D.L. 1825/24 (“Il contratto di impiego privato può anche essere fatto con prefissione di 
termine; tuttavia saranno applicabili in tal caso le disposizioni del presente decreto che presuppongono il 
contratto a tempo indeterminato, quando l’aggiunzione del termine non risulti giustificata dalla specialità 
del rapporto ed apparisca invece fatta per eludere le disposizioni del decreto”). 
23 The 1950s registered a strong expansion of temporary work, helped by the increasing weakness of trade 
unions. This phenomenon looked more and more unacceptable, given the strong economic growth phase 
Italy was experiencing.     
24 See l. 230/1962, art.1, co.1-2 (“Il contratto di lavoro si reputa a tempo indeterminato, salvo le eccezioni 
appresso indicate. E’ consentita l’apposizione di un termine alla durata del contratto: a) quando ciò sia 
richiesto dalla speciale natura dell’attività lavorativa derivante dal carattere stagionale della medesima; b) 
quando l’assunzione abbia luogo per sostituire lavoratori assenti e per i quali sussiste il diritto alla 
conservazione del posto, semprechè nel contratto di lavoro a termine sia indicato il nome del lavoratore 
sostituito e la causa della sua sostituzione; c) quando l’assunzione abbia luogo per l’esecuzione di un’opera 
o di un servizio definiti e predeterminati nel tempo aventi carattere straordinario od occasionale; d) per le 
lavorazioni a fasi successive che richiedono maestranze diverse, per specializzazioni, da quelle 
normalmente impiegate e limitatamente alle fasi complementari od integrative per le quali non vi sia 
continuità di impiego nell’ambito dell’azienda; [….]”) and art.4 (“E’ consentita la stipulazione di contratti 
di lavoro a tempo determinato purchè di durata non superiore a cinque anni, con i dirigenti amministrativi e 
tecnici, i quali possono, comunque, recedere da essi trascorso un triennio e osservata la disposizione 
dell’art.2118 c.c.”). 
25 In order to delimit the area of application of this hypothesis, a decree was issued in 1963 providing a 
rigid list of activities which could be thought of as “seasonal” (e.g. agricultural activities, but also summer 
movie workers).   40 
alternative, the adoption of temporary contracts was only recognized as an eventual 
exception. This law was also very restrictive as far as the possibility of renewal was 
concerned: in particular, it established that fixed-term contracts could only be renewed 
once and for a time period not exceeding the original one. In case of renewals exceeding 
30 days the original deadline, contracts were automatically converted to open-end ones.  
Unlike the previous regulations, it also extended to fixed-term workers some of the 
guarantees previously recognized only to permanent workers.  
 
2. The normative evolution of fixed-term contracts during the 1970s and 1980s 
The 1962 law has been representing the basic reference for temporary work regulation in 
the last forty years. Starting from 1977, however, its original rigidity has been partly 
smoothed overtime through a series of normative interventions, aiming at progressively 
expanding the application area of fixed-term contract. The worsening condition of the 
Italian labor market led indeed policy makers to partially abandon the traditional negative 
view on temporary work, which could represent at that time a useful flexible tool to fight 
against rising unemployment. For example, compared to the original list of “exceptions” 
to open-end contracts provided by the first paragraph of the 1962 law, the possibility to 
hire under fixed-term contracts in case of particular activity hikes was progressively 
extended to the tourist and commerce sectors (law 876/1977), and later on to the 
remaining part of the economy (law 79/1983). Besides, the increasing need for labor 
market flexibility led in 1984 to the introduction of special types of temporary contracts 
specifically designed to facilitate the initial entry into the labor market (particularly for 
the youth) and hence partially departing from the general rule in order to escape its 
rigidity. In particular, two different contract typologies were introduced – the 
Apprenticeship contract and the Work and Training contract – both aiming at providing 
work experience together with professional training to young workers (16 to 24 years old 
in case of Apprenticeship contracts, 16 to 32 years old in case of Work and Training 
contracts) entering the labor market. According to the law, the duration of these contracts 
can range from 18 months to 4 years, with different length and rules according to 
worker’s age and education. Unlike the original idea of fixed-term contracts, these 
contract models have been thought of as “stepping stones” towards permanent   41 
employment and thus enjoy a favorable tax treatment. In particular, firms hiring under 
these special contractual forms are rewarded through lower social contributions, where 
the magnitude of this reduction ranges from 25 per cent to 100 per cent according to the 
specific type of contract, the size of the firm, the economic sector as well as the 
geographical area.  
 
3. The EU Directive on Temporary Contracts and the latest Italian reform 
 
In 1999 the European Union issued a specific Directive of temporary work, aiming at 
facilitating the adoption of this contractual form across the Member States. After two 
years, in August 2001 Italy implemented this Directive through a legislative act which 
represents the first actual reform of the existing regulation in 40 years. Indeed, for the 
first time the new regulation explicitly rejects the negative prejudice towards fixed-term 
contracts. In particular, it succeeds in overcoming the original principle according to 
which “if none of the listed  exceptions apply”, then “the contract has to be considered an 
open-end one”. Through this reform the Italian law system changes from a situation 
where every employer could hire under fixed-term contracts only if some very precise 
and limited circumstances apply to one in which the possibility to put a duration limit to a 
contract is merely conditioned to the existence of “technical, productive, organizational 
as well as substitution reasons”. At the same time, worker’s guarantee is ensured through 
the provision according to which these reasons must be explicitly (through a written act) 
stated by the employer. Therefore, this new regulation inverts the logic of the previous 
one in that the new decree specifically lists the hypotheses under which a fixed-term 
contract cannot be adopted. Moreover, it delegates to the collective bargaining process at 
the sector level the task to establish the quantitative limits, even though it explicitly lists a 
number of cases which must be excluded from any limitation (e.g. fixed-term contracts 
signed during start-ups).   42 
Appendix 2: the model with endogenous wages 
 
In this appendix we extend the model presented in the text by endogenizing second 
period wages.  We resume the analytical development from the end of paragraph 4.3.  
 
1. Pre-reform wage determination 
 
We assume that second period wages are set by a workers’ participation constraint; that 
is, second period wage equals worker’s outside opportunity as measured by the expected 
productivity of not employed workers. 
 
Thus we have three equilibrium conditions: 
 
1) A labor demand condition (derived from the maximization of the value of a fixed-term 
contract):  
                                                        2 w y FT = .                                                                (9) 
2) A firm participation condition that defines the minimum level of λ, below which the 
value of a fixed-term contract is negative: 
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 3) Workers’ participation condition: 
                                        ) | ( 2 unemployed y E w =                                               (10) 
 
Equilibrium wage is then obtained by solving simultaneously the above three equations. 
The only element we need to solve system (9),(2),(10)  is the unemployed expected 
productivity. To this end, we go through a small detour. 
 
Graph (a1) represents the market structure before the reform.  
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Graph a1: Workers distribution among labor market status before subsidy  
 
This graph shows that workers will not be hired when their attached λ is smaller than λFT; 
they will be fired if their attached λ is larger than λFT and the observed productivity is less 
than  FT y ; they will be hired otherwise. This classification is used to compute the 
expected productivity of non-employed workers and, thereby, an analytical expression for 
equation (10). 
 
The expected productivity of unemployed workers is a weighed average of the expected 
productivity of never hired and fired workers. It is worth recalling that we are assuming 
that the distributions of y and λ are independent. For the first group the expected 
productivity is  
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discounted by the fact that their quality indicator is less than the threshold level λFT 
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that is the product of the expected productivity of those with a productivity level less than 
FT y  and the expected value of the quality indicator when λ is larger than the threshold  
λFT .The number of fired workers is ()
H
FT
FT y
y
λ − 1 . 
The expected productivity of unemployed workers is then obtained by aggregation: 
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the aggregation weights are the shares of never hired and fired workers on the sum of the 
two ( ()
H
FT
FT FT y
y
λ λ − + 1 ). 
Table (1a) synthesizes workers’ and their productivity distribution among labor market 
status. For completeness we included hired workers.   
 
Table 1a: number of workers and expected productivity in different labor market status. 
Labor Market Status  Number of workers  Expected Productivity 
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With this result at hand we can rewrite equation (10) as  
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and we can compute the equilibrium values for the wage and the two thresholds. 
To solve the system we first note that it can be reduced to two equations in λ and w2:    45 
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where we have dropped the subscript FT to simplify notation. 
 
Condition (2’) describes λ as a quadratic, continuous and concave function of w that in 
the relevant range [0, YH] is increasing from  ()
) 2 (
1 2 1
r y
w r
h +
+
for w2=0 to 
h y
w1 2
 when w2=YH.  
In graph (a4), we plotted it assuming that w1 is such that  1
2 1 <
H y
w
. 
Condition (10’’) can be regarded as a second-degree equation in λ whose coefficients 
depend on w2:  
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 The solutions to this equation are two functions of λ in w2, one positive and the other 
negative valued in the relevant range of w2. The positive
26 one is  
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This is an increasing function of w2, which grows from a minimum of 0 for w2=0 to 1 for 
4
2
H y
w = . This is the relevant range of admissible solutions.  
While the analytical solution is a rather messy expression that is obtained by equating 
(2’) and (11), it is easy to see that this solution is represented by the crossing point of 
these two curves. It occurs for λ values which are positive and less than one (provided w1 
is not too large) and for a wage level lower than the unconditional mean of the 
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productivity distribution (
4
H y
). A simple equilibrium representation is shown in Graph 
(a2). 
 
Graph a2. The equilibrium before the subsidy 
 
 
 
 
5 Post-reform wage determination. 
 
After the reform, wage determination closely follows the logical development of the 
previous paragraph. However, because of the coexistence of two types of contracts we 
have two additional variables to take care of: the threshold levels for λ and y for an open-
end contract. These two additional conditions complicate the algebra, but leave the basic 
features of the model unchanged. As we did in the previous paragraph, we begin by 
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showing a graphical representation of workers’ distribution among different labor market 
status. 
  
 Graph a3: Workers distribution among labor market status after the subsidy   
 
This graph shows that workers will never be hired in either contracts when their quality 
index is smaller than λFT; they will be hired in a temporary contract if their quality index 
is between λFT and λ
* (that is the level of the quality index above which the value of an 
open-end contract is positive and larger than the value of a fixed-term one) but will be 
fired if their observed productivity turns out to be less than  FT y . Finally, workers will be 
hired into open-end positions if λ is larger than λ
* but will be retained only if their 
productivity is above the threshold OE y . 
In this model, equilibrium is represented by a vector of 5 numbers, which solves the 
following system of equations
27: 
1) A labor demand for fixed-term contracts (identical to condition (9)): 
                                                      2 w y FT =                                                                   (12) 
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2) A labor demand for open-end contracts:  
                                                  ) 1 ( 2 r c w yOE + − =                                              (13) 
3) A firm participation constraint for fixed-term contracts, which identifies the minimum 
level of λ below which the value of a fixed-term contract is negative (identical to 
condition (2)): 
                                   
2 2
1
) ( ) 1 (
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H
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= λ                                         (14)  
 4) A condition which ensures the coexistence of both fixed-term and open-end contracts 
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5) A workers’ participation condition (identical to condition (10)): 
                                         ) | ( 2 unemployed y E w =                                                 (16) 
Again, to solve the system we need an analytical expression for condition (16).  
The expected productivity of unemployed workers is a weighted average of the 
productivity of those never hired, of those fired from a temporary contract and of those 
fired from an open-end contract. As before, expected productivity for the first group is 
the average productivity of all workers discounted by the fact that their observed quality 
index is less than the λFT  threshold: 
[] [ ]
2 2
|   |
H FT
FT
y
y E hired never y E
λ
λ λ = ≤ =  
The number of these workers is  FT
H
H
FT y
y
λ λ = .  For workers who have been laid-off from 
a temporary contract, expected productivity is the product of the expected value of the 
quality index when this is in the range (λFT , λ
*], and the expected productivity of those 
with y smaller than  FT y :     
[] []
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FT FT
y
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27 To be more precise we also require the solution to have economic meaning, which implies several 
restrictions on the sets of admissible solutions. Thus, we require 1> λ
* > λFT  >0 and 
0 > > ≥ OE FT H y y y .   49 
Their number is ()
H
FT
FT y
y
λ λ −
* .  Finally, the expected productivity of workers fired from 
an open-end contract is given by the product of the expected value of the quality index 
when this is in the range (λ
*,1
 ], and the expected productivity of those with y smaller 
than  OE y :     
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Their number is ()
H
OE
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y * 1 λ − .  
The expected productivity of unemployed workers is obtained by aggregating these three 
productivities using as weights the shares of each group on the total number of workers 
who are out of work. Thus condition (16) is  
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   (16’) 
We have used relation (12) and (13) so that  ) 1 ( r c y y FT OE + − = . The complete 
description of workers and productivity distributions among labor market status is 
provided by Table a2.  
Using the fact that  ) 1 ( r c y y FT OE + − = and  FT y w = 2 , we are left with a system of 
three conditions that - if a solution exists - provides an equilibrium value for the two 
thresholds λ
* and λFT and for the second period wage. However, to keep the analysis 
along the same lines as in the pre-reform case (discussed in the previous paragraph), we 
now derive a condition that ties the two thresholds λ
* and λFT in such a way to grant the 
coexistence of both contracts for every given subsidy level. 
 
Let KFT be the value of the subsidy that equates the value of fixed-term and open-end 
contracts for λ=λFT . Consider next a marginally lower level of the subsidy K’. In this case 
the level of λ which equates the value of fixed-term and open-end contracts is λ
*> λFT. 
The difference λ
*-λFT has the following form:    50 
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We can always find a level of ∆KFT which grants the coexistence of both contracts unless 
λFT=1. 
 
 
Table 2a: workers and expected productivity in different labor market status. 
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Using this manipulation inside condition (16’) leaves us with a system of two 
relationships that relate the quality threshold level for the fixed-term contract λFT and the   51 
second period wage w2. The first relation is again condition (14), which is identical to 
condition (2’). We have discussed it in the previous paragraph. Therefore we concentrate 
on the second relationship, which is obtained by using (17) into equation (16) to get  
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where ) 1 ( ~
2 2 r c w w + − = . This relationship traces the values of λ as a function of w2 and 
qualitatively has the same characteristics of the analogous relationship for the pre-reform 
case.  It has two sets of solutions, one with positive values for λ in the relevant range of 
w2 and one that has negative solutions. We only concentrate on the set of positive 
solutions: 
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This solution has however several characteristics such that no equilibrium, one, or more 
than one equilibrium are all possible depending on the value of the parameters.  
 
The first characteristic is that, since  ) 1 ( 2 r c w yOE + − = , then the lowest meaningful value 
for w2 is c(1+r); let λFTmin be the correspondent value of λ. If for this minimum wage 
level the correspondent value of λ generated from condition (2’) is lower than λFTmin, then 
there might be no equilibrium (Graph a3a). 
 
The second characteristic is the fact that equation (18) is not a monotonic increasing 
function of w2 in the relevant range [c(1+r), yH ]. In particular, it is an increasing function 
for w2 less than a critical value
28
 and a declining function for higher values. We can 
therefore have two equilibria for the same set of parameters (graph a5b). This multiplicity 
                                                 
28 In particular, the slope of  function  ) ( 2 w β  is positive for  w2  less than    () ( )
) 4 ( 2
2 1 2 4
m
m r yH
+
− + +
 and 
negative for w2 above this threshold   52 
of equilibria can be removed if we take as admissible only the equilibrium which grants 
the coexistence of both contracts, because the second equilibrium in general occurs for 
values of w2 that imply λ
* larger than 1 (graph a5b). 
  
The one equilibrium case is shown in graph a3c.  
 
 Graph a3a. Post reform analysis: No equilibrium  case. 
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Graph a3b. Post reform analysis: Two equilibria  case. 
 
Graph a3c. Post reform analysis: one equilibrium case. 
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6 Comparison between pre- and post-subsidy equilibria. 
 
The last question we want to address concerns the comparison between pre- and post-
subsidy wages. To this end, we first notice that since condition (2’) is common to both 
pre- and post-equilibria we only need to compare (11) with (18). The analytical 
expression for the difference between the two functions is rather messy. We therefore 
simulated the wage differences for some parameter values (compatible with the existence 
of an equilibrium and the coexistence of both contracts). Simulations show that pre-
reform wages are higher than post-reform ones. This effect depends from the fact that, 
because of the firing costs, the productivity threshold for an open-end contract is 
relatively lower. Thus, the major effect of endogenous wages is that, by lowering the 
overall wage, the subsidy exherts a small impact on total employment.     55 
Table 1 
Fixed-Term Contracts In OECD Countries; 
Share And Contribution To Employment Growth 1990-2000 
(Percentage Points) 
 
  Employment Growth contributions  Share of temp Job on 
     dependent  employment 
  Temp jobs  Permanent Jobs  Total  1990  2000 
Austria
d 2.0  -0.9  1.1  6.0  7.9 
Belgium 5.3  12.4  17.7  5.3  9.0 
Canada
f 2.3  7.0  9.3  11.3  12.5 
Czech Republic
b 2.4  -5.4  -2.9  5.5  9.3 
Denmark -0.1  5.0  4.8  10.8  10.2 
Finland
a 4.4  2.7  7.1  13.2  16.5 
France 5.9  3.9  9.9  10.4  14.5 
Germany
a 2.4 -4.5  -2.1  10.3  12.6 
Greece -1.0  19.5  18.5  16.6  13.1 
Hungary
f   2.2  5.5  7.7  5.6  7.0 
Iceland
a 38.3  -20.8  17.5  14.7  45.3 
Ireland -1.6  48.9  47.4  8.5  4.4 
Italy 4.8  -6.0  -1.2  5.2  10.1 
Japan 3.8  7.6  11.4  10.6  12.9 
Luxemburg 0.6  16.6  17.2  3.6  3.7 
Mexico
d 3.0  24.2  27.2  23.1  20.5 
Netherlands 9.9  15.2  25.1  7.6  13.8 
Norway
e -2.8  10.8  8.0  12.9  9.3 
Portugal 3.9  4.8  8.7  18.3  20.4 
Slovak Republic
c 1.8  -2.2  -0.4  2.9  4.9 
Spain 10.2  14.4  24.7  29.8  32.1 
Sweden
d 1.7  5.0  6.6  12.4  14.6 
Switzerland
a -1.4  0.8  -0.5  13.0  11.7 
Turkey 14.1  25.8  39.9  14.4  20.4 
United Kingdom  1.9  4.6  6.5  5.2  6.7 
          
a) 1991-2000; b) 1993-2000; c) 1994-2000; d) 1995-2000; e) 1996-2000; f) 1997-2000; 
Source: OECD Employment  Outlook , 2002   56 
Figure 1 
Employees With Fixed-Term Contracts As A Share Of All Employees 
(Percentage Points) 
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Source: Bank of Italy, Annual report for the year 2000 
 
Figure 2 
Employment by type of labor contract
(Changes, in 000, on the correspondent quarter)
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
94.1 94.2 94.3 94.4 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4 96.1 96.2 96.3 96.4 97.1 97.2 97.3 97.4 98.1 98.2 98.3 98.4 99.1 99.2 99.3 99.4 00,1 00,2 00,3 00,4
Quarters
Open-End contract Fixed term Total employees
Sources: Authors’ calculation on Labour Force Survey data   57 
Table 2 
Basic Characteristics Of Fixed-Term Contracts In Italy
1 
(Percentage Points) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
           
By  gender           
Males    51.2 52.9 52.5 54.3 53.9 53.4 52.3 51.9 50.4 
Females  48.8 47.1 47.5 45.7 46.1 46.6 47.7 48.1 49.6 
           
B y   A g e            
15-19  10.5  9.0 8.8 8.1 7.2 7.3 6.5 6.2 5.7 
20-24  22.9 21.8 22.2 22.1 21.0 21.8 21.6 19.5 18.0 
25-29  19.1 20.6 19.9 19.7 20.2 19.5 20.0 19.5 20.3 
30-34  14.2 14.2 16.0 16.3 17.3 16.4 16.3 15.9 15.8 
35-39  10.0 10.6 10.1 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.7 13.2 13.6 
40-44  6.8 7.5 7.3 7.5 7.7 8.3 8.7 9.0 9.5 
45  and  over  16.5 16.4 15.7 15.2 15.5 15.4 15.2 16.8 17.1 
           
By  School  level           
Lower  secondary  school  or  less 63.9 60.0 58.4 56.4 54.8 52.3 49.8 48.0 48.0 
High  School  28.4 31.3 32.3 34.2 34.6 36.8 38.2 39.5 39.4 
College    7.6  8.7  9.3  9.3  10.6 10.9 12.0 12.4 12.6 
           
B y   S e c t o r            
Agriculture  20.8 18.7 18.0 16.2 13.7 12.9 12.1 11.1 11.7 
Manufacturing    14.9 16.6 17.6 17.5 17.9 19.3 18.1 18.4 17.1 
Construction  12.4 11.5 10.7 10.9 11.1  9.9  8.8  8.4  8.4 
Services  51.9 53.2 53.7 55.4 57.3 57.9 60.9 62.1 62.8 
           
By  Reasons  for  Fixed  Term  Contract          
Work  and  Training    23.6 23.3 23.3 24.5 24.8 29.9 32.3 31.4 29.2 
No  better  opportunities  51.7 52.3 51.0 49.9 49.3 45.3 40.7 43.1 44.4 
Don't  want  a  Open  End  Contract  7.2 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.7 3.9 4.6 4.3 4.3 
Other  reasons  17.5 19.0 20.5 20.8 21.2 20.9 22.4 21.2 22.1 
           
As  share  of  employees  6.1 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.5  10.1  9.8 
           
(1) Workers 15-65 years old 
Sources: Authors’ calculation on Labour Force Survey data 
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Figure 3 
 
Share Of Low-Paid Workers In Italy, 1977-1998 
(Percentage Points) 
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Table 3 
Log-Hourly Wage And Hour Differentials In the Year 2000
1 
 
  Log of hourly wage  Annual hours of work 
  Males Females Males Females 
Unadjusted      
Fixed term  -.324 (.026)  -.089 (.030)  -533.3 (25.96)  -588.77 (32.69) 
Temporary   -.433 (.079)  -.365 (.092)  -258.6 (78.21)  -261.93 (100.50) 
      
Adjusted
2      
Fixed term  -.117 (.023)  .019 (.028)  -391.3 (27.39)  -394.89 (29.71) 
Temporary   -.211 (.068)  -.213 (.082)  14.60 (78)  -9.17(86.87) 
      
1) References are wages and hours of Workers in Open End contracts, standard error in parenthesis. 
2) Controls include age, age square, a full set of dummies for education (8 categories), for marital 
status (4 categories), for geographical area (3 categories), dummy for part time     
Sources: Authors’ calculation on Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth  
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Table 4 
Transitions Among Labor Market Status In Italy. October 1999 
(Percentage Points) 
Labour market status at October 1999 
Different job   
Same job  Self-
employed 
Open-end 
contract 
Fixed- term 
contract 
Unemployed 
and Inactive 
Total 
 
 
Initial labour market status 
 
After three years from the first job  
Self-employed  82.2  3.4 3.5 1.7 9.2  100 
Employee with an open-end 
contract 
81.3  1.3 8.8 1.8 6.8  100 
Employee with a fixed-term 
contract  
20.3  3.6  20.8 17.6 37.8  100 
All  62.4 2.3 11.6 6.7 16.9  100 
  After five years from the first job 
Self-employed  79.3  5.1 7.5 2.8 5.3  100 
Employee with an open-end 
contract 
71.0 2.8 16.3 2.2  7.8  100 
Employee with a fixed-term 
contract  
9.9  6.1  36.4 17.2 30.4  100 
All  54.6 4.2 20.5 6.7 13.9  100 
        
Source: Istat, Annual report for 1999 
 
Table 5 
Transitions Out Of Fixed-Term Contracts. October 1999 
(Percentage Points) 
Labour market status at October 1999 
Different job 
Persons entering the labour 
market with fixed-term contract 
   
 
Same job  Self-
employed 
Open-end 
contract 
Fixed- term 
contract 
Unemployed 
and Inactive 
Total 
  After three years from the first job 
Male  19.2  3.3  23.2 14.6 39.7  100 
Female    21.4  3.8  18.3 20.7 35.8  100 
College graduate    43.2  3.8  23.0  17.2  12.9  100 
High school graduate   14.9  5.2  23.3  18.0  38.9  100 
8
th grade graduate   18.5  0.7  15.4  16.9  48.5  100 
All  20.3  3.6  20.8 17.6 37.8  100 
  After five years from the first job 
Male  8.0  6.2  38.3 19.6 27.9  100 
Female    12.1  6.1  34.1 14.2 33.5  100 
College graduate    17.1  12.5  38.1  19.6  12.7  100 
High school graduate   8.0  5.1  40.4  17.9  28.5  100 
8
th grade graduate   10.7  5.8  28.6  15.0  40.0  100 
All  9.9  6.1  36.4 17.2 30.4  100 
        
Source: Istat, Annual report for 1999 
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Figure 4 
Reduction In The Labor Cost Due To The Tax Credit By Area And Sector 
(Percentage Points) 
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Figure 5 
Employment by type of labour contract
(Changes, in 000, on the correspondent quarter)
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Figure 6 
Usage Of Tax Credit: Evidence From Fiscal Data For Year 2001 
(Revenues Figures Are Flows, Workers Figures Are Stocks) 
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Table 6 
Basic Characteristics Of The Sample 
(Percentage Points) 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
           
By  gender           
Males    59.5 59.0 58.8 58.7 58.6 57.3 56.6 54.0 53.0 
Females  40.5 41.0 41.2 41.3 41.4 42.7 43.4 46.0 47.0 
           
A g e            
15-19  11.9  11.4  10.4  9.0 8.1 7.7 7.3 7.3 6.2 
20-24  28.1 27.3 26.7 26.4 26.1 26.5 24.6 23.4 21.5 
25-29  19.4 20.2 19.8 22.6 22.3 22.7 23.1 22.5 24.4 
30-34  14.3 14.4 16.4 15.8 16.2 16.9 17.1 16.6 16.8 
35-39  9.6  10.4  9.7  9.7  10.5 10.2 10.3 12.2 12.3 
40-44  6.2 6.5 7.1 7.2 5.9 6.7 7.9 7.7 8.5 
45  and  over  10.6 9.8 10.0 9.3 10.8 9.3  9.8 10.3  10.5 
           
School  level           
Lower  secondary  school  or  less  57.2 55.5 54.9 51.6 50.0 46.9 45.8 43.1 43.2 
High  School  34.9 36.3 37.9 39.9 40.3 42.2 42.5 45.5 43.6 
College    7.9 8.2 7.2 8.4 9.7  10.9  11.7  11.5  13.2 
           
S e c t o r            
Manufacturing    30.0 33.3 34.9 31.9 32.2 31.7 29.0 28.8 26.9 
Construction  16.3 14.1 14.0 14.3 14.2 12.4 12.1 10.7 10.7 
Services  53.7 52.6 51.1 53.8 53.6 55.9 58.9 60.5 62.5 
           
Type  of  Contract           
Open  End  contracts  71.4 68.5 69.7 67.1 66.4 62.5 63.3 62.5 64.5 
Fixed  term  contracts    28.6 31.5 30.3 32.9 33.6 37.5 36.7 37.5 35.5 
Work and Training   8.2  8.0  9.0  9.9  10.1  14.5  14.1  14.3  10.8 
No  better  opportunities  14.0 15.5 13.4 14.6 15.0 14.9 13.2 14.4 14.9 
Don't  want  a  O.  E.C.  1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 
Other  reasons  5.2 6.9 6.7 7.3 7.1 6.8 8.2 7.2 8.3 
           
           
Number    of    workers  1,033,806 1,180,133 1,363,629 1,305,653 1,319,812 1,482,466 1,516,225 1,619,386 1,560,900 
Number  of  Observations  3,593 4,072 4,779 4,519 4,533 5,084 5,167 5,474 5,146 
           
 Sources: Authors’ calculation on Labour Force Survey data    63 
 
Figure 7 
Share Of Open-End Contracts On Total New Contracts 
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Figure 8 
Years Of Schooling Of New Hires With Open-End Contracts Relative To New Hires With Fixed-Term 
Contracts 
(Indexes, 1993=1) 
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Figure 9 
Age Distribution Of Share Of Open-End Contract On Total New Hires 
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Figure 10 
Share Of Fixed-Term Contracts On Total New Hires (1) 
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Table 7 
Identification Strategies 
 
 Model  Treated  Sample  Control 
W1 
Aged 25 or 
more in 2001 
Aged 25 or 
more in 1993-
2001 
Aged 25 and older in 
2000-1993 
Within age group 
identification 
W2  Aged 25-35 in 
2001 
Aged 25-35 in 
1993-2001 
Aged 25-35 in 2000-
1993 
AW1 
Aged 25 or 
more in 2001 
Aged 15 or 
more in 1993-
2001 
Aged 15-24 in 2001-
1993 + 25 and older in 
2000-1993 
AW2 
Aged 25-35 in 
2001 
Aged 15 or 
more in 1993-
2001 
Aged 15-24 and 36 or 
more in 2001-1993+25 
and older in 2000-1993 
Across+within 
age group 
identification 
AW3 
Aged 25-35 in 
2001 
Aged 25 or 
more in 1993-
2001 
Aged 36 or more in 
1993-2001 + 25 and 
older in 2000-1993 
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Table 8 
Probability Of Being Hired With An Open-End Contract Conditional On Being Hired In The Previous 
12 Months
1 
 
  Model W1  Model W2  Model AW1  Model AW2  Model AW3 
  M.E. t-stat M.E. t-stat M.E. t-stat M.E.  t-stat  M.E.  t-stat 
treated    .016 1.37 .021 1.27 .007 0.45 .033  2.10  .042  2.36 
treated*educ
2  .010 4.28 .011 3.57 .011 4.76 .012  3.79  .010  3.16 
Age  .016 0.88 .331  .72  .045 6.44 .043  6.01  .013  .74 
Age2  -.003 -0.68 -.001  -.68  -.001 -4.97 -.001  -4.59 .000 -.50 
Age3  .000 0.53 .000  .64  .000 4.04 .000  3.74  .000  .35 
Educ  -.001 -0.15 -.005  -.40  -.018 -3.57 -.019  -3.82  -.003  -.51 
Educ2  -.001 -6.08 -.001 -5.70 -.001 -5.42 -.001  -5.55  -.001  -6.06 
Age*educ
2  .001 5.06 .001 2.60 .001 9.99 .001  10.75  .001  5.68 
Female  -.133  -20.6  -.110 -13.25 -.096 -18.15 -.096  -18.15  -.133  -20.6 
               
1993  .077 5.80 .057 3.20 .087 7.97 .087  8.00  .078  5.85 
1994  .040 3.12 .033 1.97 .055 5.25 .056  5.26  .041  3.15 
1995  .069 5.76 .063 3.93 .063 6.23 .063  6.24  .070  5.79 
1996  .032 2.61 .027 1.65 .041 4.00 .041  4.02  .032  2.63 
1997  .032 2.67 .030 1.82 .034 3.33 .034  3.34  .033  2.69 
1998  .003  0.28  .010 .62 .002 .28 .003  .30  .036  .31 
1999  .004 0.39 -.001 -.09 .007  .75  .008 .76 .005  .40 
2000 Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference 
2001  --  --  .012  .77  -.000 -.03 -.014  -.87 
             
Number of 
observations  27847 16490 42367  42367  27847 
1. Probit model. ME stands for marginal effect. Data are from the October survey of each year, include regional and 
marital status dummies. 2. Scaled by the mean educ=10.24 years. 
 
 Table 9 
Probability Of Being Hired With An Open-End Contract Conditional On Being Hired In The 
Previous 12 Months; Non Parametric Specification
 1 
 
  Model W1  Model W2  Model AW1  Model AW2  Model AW3 
  M.E.  t-stat  M.E. t-stat M.E.  t-stat  M.E. t-stat M.E. t-stat 
Treated    -.009  -.57  -.008 -.34 -.024 -1.20 -.006  -0.27 .007 0.29 
Treated*high 
school  .029  1.49  .045 1.71 .031  1.55  .046 1.72 .043 1.69 
Treated*college  .105  4.43  .107 3.62 0.11  4.51  .109 3.60 .104 3.58 
High  school  -.251  -.73  .035 .96 .214 0.96 .214  0.96  -.251  .345 
College  -.486  -1.57  -.069 -1.44 -.457  -1.49  -.396 -1.35 -.416 -1.43 
Female -.133  -20.45  -.109 
-
13.11 -.096 -18.06 -.096 
-
18.08 -.133 
-
20.47 
                
1993  .075  5.58  .056 3.14  .085 7.82 .085  7.82  .075  5.60 
1994  .039  3.06  .034 1.96 .055  5.23  .055 5.23 .039 3.08 
1995  .069  5.70  .063 3.90 .063  6.20  .062 6.20 .069 5.72 
1996  .032  2.64  .027 1.65 .042  4.10  .042 4.11 .033 2.67 
1997  .034  2.76  .030 1.87 .035  3.44  .035 3.44 .034 2.78 
1998  .003  .29  .011 .68 .003 0.29 .003 .29 .004 .31 
1999  .005  .46  -.001  -.04 .007 0.77 .007 .77 .006 .47 
2000 Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference 
2001  --  --  .015 0.94 .004 .33 -.009  -.56 
                
Number of 
observations  27817 16490  42335  42335  27817 
1. Probit model. ME stands for marginal effect. Data are from the October survey of each year, include age dummy 
fully interacted with school dummies: also include regional and marital status dummies  
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Table 10 
 
Probability Of Being Hired With An Open-End Contract Conditional On Being Hired In The 
Previous 12 Months. Specification With Treated Group For Each Year 
1 
 
   W1  W2 AW1 AW2 AW3 
    M.E.  T stat  M.E.  T stat  M.E.  T stat  M.E.  T stat  M.E.  T stat 
              
Average  effect           
  2001  0.018  1.5  0.029 1.74 0.016 0.84 0.039 2.49 0.057 2.82 
  2000  Reference  Reference  0.018 1.02 0.020 1.26 0.027  1.3 
  1999  0.007  0.6  0.011 0.67 0.013 0.74 0.018 1.15 0.024 1.12 
  1998  0.005  0.4  0.018 1.11 0.024 1.34 0.039 2.48 0.050 2.39 
  1997  0.034 2.79 0.038 2.23 0.021 1.13 0.021 1.26 0.022 1.01 
  1996  0.034 2.72 0.036 2.15 0.002 0.11 0.007  0.4  0.019 0.83 
  1995  0.070 5.75 0.073 4.44 0.046  2.5  0.033 1.97 0.015 0.64 
  1994  0.041 3.16 0.041 2.36 -0.013  -0.68  -0.006  -0.33 0.014 0.59 
  1993  0.081 6.01 0.064 3.53 0.009 0.41 -0.021  -1.04  -0.028  -1.05 
              
Interaction  with  school  (2)           
  2001  0.006 2.18 0.005 1.26 0.017 5.05 0.013 3.94 0.005 1.16 
  2000  0.002 0.31 0.001 0.05 0.010 2.95 0.008 2.23 0.000 -0.11 
  1999  -0.006 -2.03 -0.009 -2.15 0.004  1.09 -0.002 -0.54 -0.009 -2.29 
  1998  -0.003 -1.08 -0.006 -1.45 0.007  2.02  0.002  0.5  -0.006 -1.52 
  1997  -0.001 -0.35 -0.006 -1.27 0.009  2.45  0.002  0.5  -0.006 -1.37 
  1996  -0.003 -0.93 -0.008 -1.69 0.007  1.93  0.000 -0.02 -0.008 -1.84 
  1995  -0.007 -2.03 -0.010 -2.23 0.003  0.9  -0.002 -0.61 -0.010  -2.3 
  1994  -0.005 -1.65 -0.005 -1.13 0.005  1.29  0.003  0.65 -0.006 -1.28 
  1993  0.000  0.1 -0.004  -0.89 0.010 2.71 0.003 0.82 -0.005  -0.95 
              
Year  effect              
  2001       0.020  1.11  0.009  0.68  -0.003  -0.16 
  2000      Reference Reference Reference 
  1999          0.013 0.73 0.013 1.05 0.014 0.76 
  1998       0.001  0.04  -0.001  -0.1  -0.007  -0.4 
  1997          0.034 1.92 0.037 2.86 0.040 2.13 
  1996          0.052 2.99 0.050 3.83 0.043 2.23 
  1995       0.047  2.74  0.063  4.9  0.082  4.43 
  1994          0.074 4.22 0.068 5.11 0.052 2.66 
  1993       0.094  5.3  0.103  7.62  0.110  5.49 
1. Model specified in table 8.  Probit model. ME stands for marginal effect. Data are from the October survey of each year; 
in addition to the reported variables models include cubic in age, quadratic in year of schooling, interaction between age 
and year of schooling, female dummy and  regional and marital status dummies. 2. Scaled by the mean educ=10.24 years.   69 
Table 11 
Probability Of Being Hired With An Open-End Contract Conditional On Being 
Hired In The Previous 12 Months. Specification With Treated Group For Each 
Year
1; Explaining Year 2000 Effects 
   Model  AW1 
   Basic  Basic and controls for 
northern regions 
Basic and controls 
labor shortage 
    M.E. T  stat M.E. T  stat M.E. T  stat 
          
2001  0.016  0.84  0.017 0.9 0.017  0.91 
2000  0.018 1.02 0.018 1.02 0.021 1.17 
1999  0.013 0.74 0.015 0.84 0.015 0.86 
1998  0.024 1.34 0.025 1.43 0.023 1.32 
1997  0.021 1.13 0.023 1.24 0.020 1.09 
1996  0.002 0.11 0.002 0.11 0.002 0.09 
1995  0.046 2.5 0.050  2.74  0.046  2.54 
1994  -0.013 -0.68 -0.013 -0.67 -0.013 -0.67 
Average effect 
1993  0.009 0.41 0.011 0.52 0.011 0.54 
          
2001  0.017 5.05 0.020 4.95 0.012 3.31 
2000  0.010 2.95 0.010 2.62 0.002 0.46 
1999 0.004  1.09  0.010  2.4  -0.004  -0.87 
1998  0.007 2.02 0.011 2.86 0.007 2.06 
1997  0.009 2.45 0.015 3.51 0.012 3.14 
1996  0.007 1.93 0.008 1.83 0.014 3.29 
1995  0.003 0.9 0.014  3.15  0.008  2.01 
1994  0.005 1.29 0.007 1.51 0.006  1.7 
Interaction with 
school(2) 
1993  0.010 2.71 0.018 4.14 0.018 3.94 
          
Labor shortage 
indicator* schooling(2)         0.004 3.1 
          
2001    -0.005  -1.21    
2000    -0.001  -0.16    
1999    -0.011  -2.53    
1998    -0.009  -2.02    
1997    -0.012  -2.46    
1996    -0.002  -0.34    
1995    -0.019  -3.82    
1994    -0.003  -0.62    
Interaction  with school 
(2) in the northern   
regions 
1993    -0.017  -2.95    
          
2001  0.020 1.11 0.020 1.11 0.021 1.18 
2000       
1999  0.013 0.73 0.013 0.74 0.013 0.76 
1998  0.001 0.04 0.001 0.04 0.004 0.22 
1997  0.034 1.92 0.034 1.92 0.037 2.11 
1996  0.052 2.99 0.052 2.99 0.055 3.16 
1995  0.047 2.74 0.047 2.75 0.049 2.85 
1994  0.074 4.22 0.074 4.22 0.076 4.36 
Year effects 
1993  0.094 5.3 0.094 5.3 0.094  5.29 
1. Model AW1 of table 10.  Probit model. ME stands for marginal effect. Data are from the October survey of each 
year; in addition to the reported variables models include cubic in age, quadratic in year of schooling, interaction 
between age and year of schooling, female dummy and  regional and marital status dummies. 2. Scaled by 
the mean educ=10.24 years.   70 
Figure 11 
 
Share Of Manufacturing Firms With Difficulties In Recruiting Labor Force 
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Figure 12 
 
Estimated Change In Probability Of Being Hired With An Open-End Contract For The Treated 
Group (Reference: Year 2000). 
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Table 12 
Probability Of Being Hired in The Previous 12 Months
1 
 
 
  Model W1  Model W2  Model AW1  Model AW2  Model AW3 
  M.E. t-stat M.E. t-stat M.E. t-stat M.E.  t-stat  M.E.  t-stat 
treated    0.002  1.68 0.01 2.23  0.003  1.34  0.001  0.74  0.005  2.48 
               
Age*100  0.007  0.04 7.58 0.63 2.88  45.39  2.88  44.91  0.002  0.01 
Age2*100 0.018  4.26  -0.19  -0.48  -0.05  -29.30  -0.05  -28.92  0.018  4.32 
Age3*100 -0.03  -10.11  0.02  0.36  0.02  13.06  0.02  12.88  -0.03  -10.2 
Educ*100  -0.25 -4.87 -3.01 -9.61 -0.67  -15.49  -0.67  -15.50  -0.25  -4.89 
Educ2*100 0.02  9.13  -0.01  -1.72  0.02  10.60  0.020  10.58  0.02  9.08 
Age*Educ
2*100  0.01 14.09 0.13 13.31 0.02 10.60  0.020  28.36  0.01  14.15 
Female -0.11  -120.5  -0.17  -63.6  -0.09  28.30  -0.085  -111.8  -0.11  -120.5 
               
1993  -0.012 -9.23 -0.035 -8.28 -0.013  -11.15  -0.013  -11.13  -0.012  -9.22 
1994  -0.015 -12.03 -0.039  -9.46  -0.016 -13.20 -0.016  -13.19  -0.015 -12.0 
1995  -0.012 -9.28 -0.028 -6.61 -0.012 -9.97 -0.012  -9.96  -0.012  -9.28 
1996  -0.012 -9.77 -0.028 -6.55 -0.014  -11.50  -0.014  -11.49  -0.012  -9.77 
1997  -0.012 -9.17 -0.029 -6.88 -0.012  -10.46  -0.012  -10.45  -0.012  -9.17 
1998  -0.011 -8.93 -0.022 -5.26 -0.010 -8.77 -0.010  -8.77  -0.011  -8.93 
1999  -0.007 -5.15 -0.014 -3.22 -0.007 -5.64 -0.007  -5.64  -0.007  -5.15 
2000 Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference 
2001 --  --  -0.002  -0.89  -.000  -0.11  0.000  0.03 
Nobs  488374 140178 684061  684061  488374 
Mean dep.var.  0.106  0.177  0.102  0.102  0.106 
1. Probit model. ME stands for marginal effect. Data are from the October survey of each year, include 
regional and marital status dummies. 2) scaled by the mean educ==10.3 years 
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Figure 13 
Equilibrium Workers’ Distribution among labor market statuses estimated on the basis of 
1999 to 2000 transition matrix 
(Percentage points) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations on Istat data.   75 
Table 13 
 
Probability Of Being Hired With An Open-End Contract Conditional On Being Hired In The Previous 
12 Months: alternative estimation methods
1 
 
 
 
  Model W1  Model W2  Model AW1  Model AW2  Model AW3 
  M.E. t-stat M.E. t-stat M.E. t-stat M.E.  t-stat  M.E.  t-stat 
Probit model               
               
Treated  .016 1.37 .021 1.27 .007  .45 .032  2.10  .042  2.36 
Interaction 
with educ
2 .010 4.28 .011 3.57 .011 4.76 .012  3.79  .010  3.16 
               
Linear 
probability 
model               
               
Treated  .016 1.35 .020 1.27 .010  .60  .033  2.15  .040  2.27 
Interaction 
with educ
2 .010 4.26 .011 3.58 .011 4.78 .012  3.87  .010  3.18 
               
Instrumental 
Variables               
               
Treated  .019 1.49 .024 1.41 .004  .20  .034  2.05  .052  2.64 
Interaction 
with educ
2 .011 4.80 .014 4.08 .012 5.22 .014  4.33  .012  3.71 
          
1) Data derive from the October survey of each year and include regional and marital status dummies. 2) scaled by the 
mean educ=10.24 years 